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THE PLIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR IN 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
David H. Webber 
ABSTRACT—Individual investors victimized by securities fraud have no 
voice in directing class actions brought on their behalf once institutional 
investors obtain lead plaintiff appointments. The same holds for state-level 
transactional class actions claiming breaches of fiduciary duty by boards of 
directors in connection with mergers and acquisitions. In theory, the 
interests of institutional and individual investors align, nullifying the need 
for a separate voice for individuals; one rationale for the lead plaintiff 
modifications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was 
that individuals would benefit from the sophistication of institutional 
investor lead plaintiffs. But in practice, individual investors’ interests in 
these actions often differ from, and may directly conflict with, those of 
institutional lead plaintiffs. The routine appointment of institutional lead 
plaintiffs without regard to these conflicts effectively elevates the interests 
of institutional over individual investors, running afoul of procedural 
requirements that lead plaintiffs be typical and adequate class 
representatives. This Article examines the recurrent conflicts between these 
two groups of investors and suggests that the best remedy is for courts to 
appoint representative individual investors as co-lead plaintiffs with 
institutional investors. This Article proposes a procedure for selecting such 
individual co-lead plaintiffs from the pool of sophisticated individuals who 
are likely to be class members. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Individual investors victimized by securities fraud have no voice in 
directing class actions brought on their behalf once institutional investors 
obtain lead plaintiff appointments. The same holds for state-level 
transactional class actions claiming breaches of fiduciary duty by boards of 
directors in connection with mergers and acquisitions. Advocates for the 
status quo, and those who see no reason to change it, justify this 
marginalization of individual investors by institutional ones in three ways. 
First, institutional and individual investors share the same deterrent and 
compensatory interests in class actions; therefore, in representing their own 
interests, institutional investors represent those of individuals too. Second, 
the superior legal and financial acumen of institutional investors makes 
them more motivated and sophisticated monitors of class counsel than 
individual investors.1 Third, individual investors are “at best uninformed, at 
 
1  See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he goal of the 
Reform Act’s lead plaintiff provision is to locate a person or entity whose sophistication and interest in 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601982
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worst fools,”2 whose interests are best looked after by institutions.3 In this 
Article, I challenge all three of these assertions. I argue that institutional and 
individual investors do not always share the same interests in litigation, that 
individual investors can be highly motivated lead plaintiffs, and that there is 
substantial evidence in the finance literature suggesting that at least a subset 
of such investors are sophisticated and consistently outperform institutions.4 
This is not to deny the fact that institutional investors have brought 
numerous benefits to federal securities class actions since passage of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. Such benefits 
include decreasing the probability of a case being dismissed, increasing 
monetary recoveries, and improving the independence of boards at 
defendant companies.5 Some of these benefits have carried over to state-
level transactional cases since Delaware imported the PSLRA’s preference 
for institutional investor lead plaintiffs into its law.6 For example, in a 
separate empirical project, I found that institutional lead plaintiffs challenge 
poorer quality deals than do individual investors and that some institutional 
lead plaintiffs—notably public pension funds—correlate with improved 
outcomes for shareholders.7 Without ignoring those benefits, this Article 
argues that troubling conflicts of interest between institutional and 
 
the litigation are sufficient to permit that person or entity to function as an active agent for the 
class . . . .” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 731 and S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689); Elliott J. 
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can 
Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2126 (1995) (“Those investors 
have the knowledge and financial sophistication necessary to serve as effective litigation monitors. Their 
stake in the outcome of class actions would give them an incentive to do that job well.”). 
2  Joshua D. Coval, David A. Hirshleifer & Tyler Shumway, Can Individual Investors Beat the 
Market? 6 (Harvard Univ. Sch. of Fin., Working Paper No. 04-025, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=364000. 
3  See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 & n.34 (noting that settlements negotiated under the supervision of 
institutional plaintiffs will be more “fair and reasonable” than other settlements (quoting Weiss & 
Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105)). 
4  See discussion infra Part III. 
5  E.g., C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. FIN. 
ECON. 356, 380–81 (2009); James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of 
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1636–39 (2006) (finding that 
institutional investors “increase settlements by 0.04% for every 1% increase in Provable Losses”); 
Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension 
Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions 24, 30–31 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (finding that cases 
with public-pension-fund lead plaintiffs settle for greater amounts than cases with individual lead 
plaintiffs). 
6  E.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (establishing standard for selection of lead plaintiffs favoring institutional 
investors similar to PSLRA). 
7  David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of 
Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Litigation 22–24, 34–36 (July 5, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1879647. 
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individual investors strongly suggest that institutions are often not typical 
and adequate representatives for the shareholder class as they are required 
to be by the PSLRA, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (Rule 23), and 
Rule 23’s state-law equivalents.8 As discussed below, the typicality and 
adequacy of lead plaintiffs is crucial to the legitimacy of class actions, 
justifying adjudication of the rights of absent parties by assuring that these 
parties’ interests have been adequately represented by lead plaintiffs who 
share them.9 
In the sixteen years since passage of the PSLRA, several conflicts have 
emerged between institutional and individual investors. Institutions’ 
frequent use of derivatives trading, their inability to sell their substantial 
stakes in the defendant even after a fraud is revealed for fear of further 
harming the share price,10 their implicit willingness to exchange monetary 
compensation for corporate governance reform,11 and, in the transactional 
context, their occasional ownership of both target and bidder companies 
give them litigation incentives that at times clash with those of individual 
investors. In practice, as will be shown below, courts have disregarded 
these conflicts in continuing to appoint institutional lead plaintiffs. This 
typicality and adequacy problem is compounded by the fact that courts 
scarcely address it when selecting a lead plaintiff, instead reserving the 
inquiry for the class certification stage, by which time the case may already 
have been settled by the potentially atypical and inadequate class 
representative.12 Addressing the problem at this later stage increases costs to 
the class, either by imposing a new lead plaintiff in midstream and 
jeopardizing a settlement or, more likely, by not imposing a new lead 
plaintiff and accepting a settlement negotiated by a party of questionable 
representativeness. 
By elucidating these clashes, this Article makes an early contribution 
to the emerging literature on shareholder conflicts with other minority 
 
8  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(4); see, e.g., MD. R. CIV. 
P. 2-231; MASS. R. CIV. P. 23. 
9  See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing Rule 23’s typicality and adequacy requirements); see 
also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 80–83 (Found. Press 2d ed. 2008) (discussing Rule 23’s 
requirement of adequacy of representation in class action lawsuits). 
10  See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n institutional 
investor with enormous stakes in a company is highly unlikely to divest all of its holdings in that 
company, even after a securities class action is filed in which it is a class member.”); In re Royal 
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (D.N.J. 2005) (“[B]ecause of the very size of 
an institutional investor’s shareholdings, an institutional investor might be discouraged from divesting 
itself of the stock.”). 
11  See, e.g., Cendant, 264 F.3d at 219, 246–47 (noting objector’s grievance that the lead plaintiff 
negotiated a settlement including corporate governance changes that would only benefit class members 
that continued to hold Cendant stock after revelation of the fraud). 
12  See, e.g., The PSLRA and Securities Class Actions, BOLOGNESE-LAW.COM, http://www.
bolognese-law.com/PSLRA_and_Securities.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting the existence of 
“pre-certification settlement negotiations” by lead plaintiffs). 
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shareholders,13 diverging from corporate and securities law’s traditional 
preoccupation with conflicts between minority and majority shareholders or 
between shareholders and management.14 In an age of increasing 
shareholder democracy, such conflicts will proliferate and intensify. This 
Article breaks new ground by addressing these conflicts in the context of 
securities class actions.15 
While the primary purpose of this Article is to address this typicality 
and adequacy problem, it also presents an opportunity to focus on a related 
issue in the selection of lead plaintiffs: the potential motivation gap between 
individual and institutional investors. The PSLRA makes whoever has the 
largest absolute financial interest in the fraud the presumptive lead plaintiff 
among applicants for the position.16 The purpose of this provision is to favor 
selection of institutional investors who, because of their larger assets, are 
more widely and deeply invested in the markets and therefore are more 
likely to be exposed to fraud and to have the largest losses when they are so 
exposed.17 Yet, the large absolute losses that qualify institutions for lead 
plaintiff appointments are frequently trivial relative to their overall assets.18 
In contrast, comparatively small losses incurred by individuals may 
constitute a far higher percentage of the individuals’ assets, rendering the 
loss far more material to them than to institutions.19 The high materiality of 
 
13  See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 828–30 (2006) (discussing investors’ use of empty 
voting to advance their own interests at the expense of fellow shareholders); Iman Anabtawi, Some 
Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power (U.C.L.A. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 05-16, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=783044 (discussing several types 
of conflicts between shareholders). 
14  See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737, 739 (1997) (noting the importance of management, large shareholders, and individual shareholders 
to corporate governance). 
15  For simplicity, I use “securities class actions” to mean securities fraud class actions and state-
level transactional class actions. 
16  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006). 
17  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 
(noting that Congress “intend[ed] that the lead plaintiff provision will encourage institutional investors 
to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits”); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), 
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (“The Committee intends to increase the likelihood that 
institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs by requiring the court to presume that the member of 
the purported class with the largest financial stake in the relief sought is the ‘most adequate plaintiff.’”). 
18  See, e.g., Armour v. Network Assocs., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“If a 
prospective lead plaintiff shows it suffered the largest financial loss, that class member has sufficiently 
satisfied the second requirement of the lead plaintiff presumption, regardless of how that amount 
compares with the total damages in the case or the prospective lead plaintiff’s total assets.”). 
19  See e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677, at 
*6–7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) (assessing lead plaintiff applicants’ economic stakes in the lawsuit 
relative to their overall portfolios and expressing concern about the “rational apathy” of lead plaintiff 
applicants with large absolute stakes in the case, but for whom those stakes represent a negligible 
portion of their portfolios). 
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these losses may make an individual investor monitor class counsel more 
zealously than an institution.20 Moreover, institutions incur agency costs 
that individual investors do not, partially inhibiting optimal monitoring.21 
This Article asserts that in addition to improving the typicality and 
adequacy of the lead plaintiff group, its proposed solution—the 
appointment of individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs—has the 
potential to improve the motivation and sophistication of the group as well. 
Appointment of qualified individuals as co-lead plaintiffs22 with 
institutional investors offers a relatively undisruptive remedy to the 
typicality and adequacy problem. Utilizing a procedure that mirrors the 
current process of identifying the investor with the largest financial interest 
in the litigation, courts can assure selection of individual co-lead plaintiffs 
who are both sophisticated and highly motivated. Contrary to the caricature 
of individual investors as unsophisticated dupes,23 a survey of the recent 
financial literature provides evidence that there are a substantial number of 
individual investors who are at least as sophisticated and arguably more 
motivated to serve as lead plaintiffs than institutional investors.24 Such co-
lead plaintiff individual investors would be screened for the conflicts 
described below and would owe the same fiduciary duties to the class that 
the institutional investor lead plaintiff does,25 while serving as more natural 
advocates for individual investor class members and more motivated 
representatives for the class as a whole. 
This Article argues that this solution not only ameliorates the typicality 
and adequacy problems but causes little disruption to the established 
rhythms of securities class action practice, allowing courts to continue 
deferring their “searching inquiry” from the lead plaintiff appointment stage 
to the class certification stage.26  It will improve the overall motivation of 
the lead plaintiffs to maximize recovery for the class. It is calibrated to 
reduce conflicts without driving away institutional investor lead plaintiff 
 
20  See discussion infra Part I.C.1. 
21  See, e.g., Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Institutional Investors and Private Equity, 12 REV. FIN. 185, 
190–91 (2007) (discussing agency costs incurred by institutional investors when monitoring private 
equity). 
22  Throughout this Article, I use the term “co-lead plaintiff” when courts name more than one party 
as lead plaintiff. 
23  See Coval, Hirshleifer & Shumway, supra note 2, at 6. 
24  See discussion infra Part III. 
25  See generally In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 176 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating 
that any lead plaintiff has significant duties). 
26  See e.g., In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., No. 07-2257, 2008 WL 
820922, at *26 (1st Cir. Mar. 28, 2008) (“[W]hen a Rule 23 requirement relies on a novel or complex 
theory as to injury, . . . the district court must engage in a searching inquiry into the viability of that 
theory and the existence of the facts necessary for the theory to succeed.”); see also Seth H. Yeager, In 
re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation: Examining the Requisite Levels of Inquiry 
into the Merits of a Case at the Class Certification Stage, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 566–68 (2009) 
(noting that, when appropriate, courts conduct a searching inquiry at the class certification stage). 
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applicants. While it is true that institutional lead plaintiffs would have to 
adjust to operating with an individual co-lead plaintiff, this Article argues 
that the advantages of an individual co-lead outweigh the disadvantages, 
even from the institutional perspective. For example, individual co-lead 
plaintiffs will help insulate the settlement from individual investor objectors 
who appear at the settlement hearing to confront the court with the conflicts 
addressed in this Article.27 This improved insulation results from the 
enhanced procedural protections for individual investors offered by the co-
lead plaintiff structure, cohering with a primary objective of the securities 
laws28 without inhibiting market integrity and efficiency. 
An individual co-lead plaintiff can also help blunt defense arguments 
that the institutions have not been seriously harmed by the purported fraud 
and are instead engaging in political grandstanding, taking legal action for 
nonpecuniary reasons, or simply fronting for lawyers seeking to maximize 
their own compensation. As trial lawyers like to say, individuals will put a 
“human face” on the fraud.29 Participation by individual investors at 
mediation sessions, settlement conferences, or court hearings will better 
reflect the actual costs of securities fraud, shifting these negotiations from 
confrontations between financial behemoths into confrontations between 
financial behemoths plus individuals devastated by the fraud. Institutional 
plaintiffs may also benefit from this dynamic. Under this Article’s proposal, 
the individual co-lead plaintiff would have been screened and selected by 
the court and would be an official member of the lead plaintiff group. He or 
she would be treated differently than most individual investors who may 
appear at such events, with or without lawyers. Such individuals are 
perceived to be annoying interlopers,30 sometimes unfairly and sometimes 
not. Institutions can hardly complain if qualified and credible individual 
lead plaintiffs help push their settlements towards higher monetary 
compensation and more effective deterrence. 
Finally, the co-lead plaintiff approach is superior to both the status quo 
and the more extreme remedy of dividing individual and institutional 
investors into subclasses, a cure that may be more harmful than the disease. 
Subclasses may be necessary in extreme cases in order to remedy 
otherwise-insoluble conflicts, safeguard the interests of individual investors, 
and preserve their bargaining power with class counsel, institutional co-lead 
 
27  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
28  141 CONG. REC. 35, 273–76 (1995) (statement of Sen. Pete Domenici) (stating the ways in which 
the PSLRA protects individual investors). 
29  See, e.g., Thomas G. Shapiro, Trial of a Securities Class Action (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 
17, 1994), WL C938 ALI-ABA 205, 208 (“From a strategic point of view, trial counsel may want to put 
a human face on the victims of the fraud, particularly if they are sympathetic.”). 
30  See, e.g., C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1137 (noting the disparate treatment of sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors in securities class action suits). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 164 
plaintiffs, and defendants.31 But because subclasses run afoul of Congress’s 
intent that institutional investors be appointed lead plaintiffs, deprive 
individual investors of the sophistication of such institutional lead plaintiffs, 
and expose the subclasses to divide-and-conquer strategies by defendants, 
this Article concludes that the optimal solution to these intraclass conflicts 
is appointment of individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs. Courts 
should only create subclasses as a last resort, preferably on motion from a 
co-lead plaintiff, not sua sponte to avoid unnecessary work for 
overburdened courts. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I tracks the preference for 
institutional investor lead plaintiffs at both the federal and state levels. Part 
II surveys the recent finance literature on individual investors, suggesting 
that individual investors are not per se unsophisticated, as is commonly 
believed, and could be highly qualified monitors of class counsel, if 
selected skillfully. Part III explores the ways in which the interests of 
individual and institutional investors may be misaligned, including conflicts 
over derivatives trading and corporate governance reform, conflicts 
between selling and holding shareholders, and conflicts created by 
institutional ownership of both target and bidder companies in mergers and 
acquisitions. Part IV assesses possible solutions to these conflicts, including 
the use of subclasses, and ultimately concludes that the optimal solution is 
appointment of a sophisticated and motivated individual investor as a co-
lead plaintiff with an institutional investor, reserving the creation of 
subclasses for extreme cases and preferably on motion from the individual 
co-lead plaintiff. Part IV also outlines the simple procedure by which such 
an individual lead plaintiff could be selected. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. FEDERAL AND STATE LAW’S PREFERENCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR LEAD PLAINTIFFS IN SECURITIES AND 
TRANSACTIONAL CLASS ACTIONS 
A. The PSLRA Creates a Preference for Institutional Investor Lead 
Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Class Actions 
The PSLRA introduced a practice of favoring institutional investor 
lead plaintiffs in securities class actions.32 In part, the purpose of this new 
practice was to remedy the high agency costs of class action plaintiffs’ 
lawyers. Prior to the PSLRA, lead-plaintiff appointments for securities class 
actions were awarded to whichever plaintiff filed the first lawsuit.33 
 
31  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
32  S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (“The Committee 
believes that increasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit the class 
and assist the courts.”). 
33  Id. at 11 (“Courts traditionally appoint the lead plaintiff and lead counsel in class action lawsuits 
on a ‘first come, first serve’ basis.”). 
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Congress found that as a result of this race to the courthouse,  plaintiffs’ law 
firms maintained stables of “professional plaintiffs”—individual investors 
with very small financial stakes in a broad array of companies, as opposed 
to the individuals with concentrated losses proposed as co-lead plaintiffs in 
this Article.34 When a stock fraud was revealed at one of these companies, 
the lawyers would quickly sue on behalf of one of their professional 
plaintiffs.35 Such lead plaintiffs, with their minimal financial interest in the 
outcome of the case, had little incentive to actively monitor class counsel, 
allowing counsel to act primarily in its own interests rather than in those of 
the class, thus increasing agency costs for the class.36 
Congress believed that these agency costs could be reduced if the lead 
plaintiff had a large enough stake in the outcome to be incentivized to 
monitor class counsel and if the lead plaintiff were sufficiently 
sophisticated to act skillfully on its incentive.37 Hence the PSLRA’s lead 
plaintiff provision creates a presumption that  
the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this chapter is 
the person or group of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has 
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class; and . . . otherwise 
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.38 
This presumption may be rebutted “only upon proof by a member of the 
purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate 
plaintiff . . . will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; 
or . . . is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of 
adequately representing the class.”39 In adopting these provisions, Congress 
endeavored “to increase the likelihood that institutional investors will serve 
as lead plaintiffs.”40 Inspired by an argument originated by Elliott Weiss and 
John Beckerman in their article, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class 
Actions, Congress concluded that “[i]nstitutions with large stakes in class 
actions have much the same interests as the plaintiff class generally; thus, 
 
34  See id. at 9 (describing professional plaintiffs). 
35  Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2060–61 (stating that “the usual pattern is for a lawyer who 
specializes in representing plaintiffs to take the initiative,” and “plaintiffs’ attorneys recruit most of the 
investors in whose names they initiate class actions”). 
36  Cf. id. at 2056, 2061 & n.35 (noting that institutional investors have large stakes in most class 
actions and are well situated to monitor the conduct of plaintiffs’ attorneys). 
37  S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (intending to increase the likelihood that institutional investors be 
chosen as lead plaintiff); see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105 (“Further, because the 
named plaintiff or group of plaintiffs with the largest financial stake in the outcome of an action has the 
greatest economic incentive to monitor class counsel’s performance effectively, courts should adopt a 
presumption that that plaintiff or group will ‘most adequately’ represent class members’ interests.”). 
38  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2006) (emphasis added). 
39  Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)–(II). 
40  S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11. 
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courts could be more confident settlements negotiated under the supervision 
of institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair and reasonable’ than is the case with 
settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.”41 This strong 
language provides the federal courts with a mandate to place institutional 
plaintiffs at the head of class actions. 
Rule 23 of the Rules of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware 
tracks the language of its federal counterpart and similarly requires 
typicality and adequacy in a lead plaintiff.42 Subsequent to the PSLRA, 
Delaware courts adopted a similar requirement regarding the lead plaintiff’s 
financial stakes in securities class actions, with one critical difference. 
Delaware courts weigh the “relative economic stakes” of competing lead 
plaintiff movants in the outcome of the lawsuit,43 which suggests the 
possibility that the lead plaintiff that has the most at stake relative to its own 
assets, and not on an absolute scale, could be appointed lead plaintiff.44 
Below, I will discuss this possibility further. 
As Congress intended, federal courts have since interpreted the 
PSLRA’s “largest financial interest” clause to mean the largest absolute 
loss.45 Thus, whichever individual or entity incurs the largest loss and 
moves for the position becomes the presumptive lead plaintiff. As 
predicted, institutional investors now lead over 40% of securities fraud class 
actions46 and around 40% of transactional class actions in Delaware.47 
 
41  See id. (quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
42  DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(a)(3)–(4), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?
id=39138. 
43  Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., No. CIV.A. 19575, 2002 WL1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 3, 
2002) (citing TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at 
*4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) and according “the relative economic stakes” of the competing litigants 
great weight); see also Dutiel v. Tween Brands, Inc., No. 4743-CC, 2009 WL 3494626, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 28, 2009) (“[T]he motivating force behind the rulings in TCW Tech., Hirt, and Wiehl [discussing 
‘relative economic stakes’] is . . . the significance of an individual’s stake in the litigation and the 
resulting incentive the individual has to participate in the litigation and monitor his or her counsel.”). 
44  See Dutiel, 2009 WL 3494626, at *3 (critiquing view of “relative economic stakes” language as 
calling for comparison of lead plaintiff applicants’ stakes relative to each other). This opinion is silent 
about the notion that relative economic stakes could refer to the applicants’ stakes in the case relative to 
their overall portfolios or assets, but favorably cites language in Wiehl v. Eon Labs, No. Civ.A. 1116-N, 
2005 WL 696764, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005) that is supportive of this view. See infra note 82. 
45  See, e.g., Armour v. Network Assocs., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1053 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“If a 
prospective lead plaintiff shows it suffered the largest financial loss, that class member has sufficiently 
satisfied the second requirement of the lead plaintiff presumption, regardless of how that amount 
compares with the total damages in the case or the prospective lead plaintiff’s total assets.”). 
46  See, e.g., 2003 Securities Litigation Study, PWC SEC. LITIG. STUDY (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
LLP, New York, N.Y.), 2004, at 6, available at http://10b5.pwc.com/pdf/2003_study_final.pdf (“In 
2002 institutional investors and public investment or pension funds comprised 51 percent of the lead 
plaintiffs for all cases filed. In 2003 these major investors represented 42 percent of the lead plaintiffs in 
cases filed.”). 
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Overall, the use of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs correlates with 
better outcomes for shareholders in securities class actions, although it 
remains disputed whether this is because they are better lead plaintiffs or 
because they cherry-pick the best cases.48 
As a practical matter, many institutions interested in obtaining lead 
plaintiff appointments enter into portfolio-monitoring arrangements with 
plaintiffs’ law firms.49 The law firms directly access the investment 
portfolios of the institutions.50 In many instances, the law firms will 
discover a potential fraud or a suspiciously unattractive deal and notify 
institutions with significant exposure that they may qualify for lead plaintiff 
status.51 Once notified of the fraud or suspicious transaction, institutions 
typically issue a request for proposals to the firms monitoring their 
portfolios.52 The proposals state the law firms’ assessments of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the case, argue that the fund should or should not pursue 
it, and, of course, if the fund does pursue it, why it should select that firm as 
lead counsel.53 Portfolio monitoring is a likely explanation for the fact that 
institutional investors obtain lower attorneys’ fees for the class.54 The 
institutions are ideally situated to force the firms to compete with one 
another, particularly on price.55 
 
47  This statistic is based on a dataset I have collected and analyzed as part of a forthcoming 
empirical project on institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in Delaware class actions. Webber, supra 
note 7, at 7. 
48  See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing 
Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 341 (2008) (stating that 
“studies cannot determine the frequency with which funds participate actively,” and thus, “it is possible 
that . . . funds simply cherry pick the stronger securities suits”). 
49  William B. Rubenstein, What We Now Know About How Lead Plaintiffs Select Lead Counsel 
(And Hence Who Gets Attorneys Fees!) in Securities Cases, 3 CLASS ACTION ATT’Y FEE DIG. 219, 220 
(2009). 
50  See, e.g., Portfolio Monitoring Service, MOTLEY RICE, http://www.motleyrice.com/securities-
and-consumer-fraud/portfolio-monitoring-service (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (advertising portfolio 
monitoring services). 
51  Id. at 219–20. 
52  See id. (stating that funds typically have a securities firm monitor their investments for 
irregularities); see also Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C 01-
20418 JW, 2004 WL 5326262, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004) (“Nothing about these [monitoring 
agreements] renders Carpenters inadequate as a class representative.”). 
53  See Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 219 (describing requests for proposals). 
54  See id. at 220 (discussing Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Credit-Based Asset 
Servicing & Securitization, LLC, 616 F. Supp. 2d. 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding MissPERS’s 
arrangement with twelve monitoring law firms to be permissible because of MissPERS’s ability to play 
each firm off the other to lower fees)); see also Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through 
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions 25, 
30–31 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (finding that the size of attorney fee requests and awards negatively 
correlate with public pension lead plaintiffs in securities class actions). 
55  See Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 220. 
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Despite these benefits to all plaintiffs, portfolio monitoring may also 
reflect a passive approach to the lead plaintiff role. The mere existence of 
the practice is indicative of a simple fact: even the large absolute losses that 
qualify institutions for lead plaintiff appointments may still be too small for 
the institutions to notice them without assistance. This will rarely, if ever, 
be true for the individuals proposed here as co-lead plaintiffs. It is one 
illustration of why the use of individual investors who suffer lower absolute 
losses but higher losses relative to their total assets may be a superior means 
of achieving Congress’s objective: improving the lead plaintiff’s motivation 
to monitor class counsel.56 
Concern for individual investors coheres well with both traditional and 
more contemporary justifications for securities regulation and for private 
securities class actions specifically. The protection of individual investors 
has always been a core mission of securities regulation,57 and recent 
research suggests that individual investors serve the market by improving 
share price accuracy.58 Traditionally, the purpose of private securities class 
actions has been to deter fraud and to compensate shareholders.59 In the past 
decade, academics and policymakers have debated vigorously whether such 
litigation in its current form successfully accomplishes either objective. The 
primary criticism of securities class actions is the purported “circularity 
problem.”60 Like most civil litigation, securities class actions are almost 
always either dismissed or settled.61 These actions settle through payments 
made either directly by the issuer, by the issuer’s directors and officers’ 
liability insurers, or occasionally by underwriters and professionals (and 
their insurers).62 In effect, the portion of the settlement paid by the issuer 
 
56  Individuals’ motivation and the phenomenon of portfolio monitoring are discussed further below 
in Part I.C.1. 
57  See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 35,291 (1995) (statement of Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun) (stating that 
the PSLRA “was designed to maintain strong investor protection”). 
58  Alicia J. Davis, Do Individual Investors Affect Share Price Accuracy? Some Preliminary 
Evidence 1 (Univ. Mich. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-018, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=998093 (“[C]ontrary to the received wisdom, retail trading increases share price 
accuracy.” (emphasis omitted)). 
59  Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: 
Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 704–06 (noting that “[t]he central aim of the securities 
laws is to deter fraud” and arguing that a rule of agent liability supplemented by criminal enforcement is 
more optimal than the current system of enterprise liability); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 66 MD. L. REV. 348, 380–86 (2007) 
(discussing deterrence by private class actions and optimal investor compensation). 
60  Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 333, 334 (describing the circularity problem as “private securities litigation [being] socially 
wasteful because it merely transfers funds from one set of shareholders to another”). 
61  See Arlen & Carney, supra note 59, at 721 (“[G]enerally Fraud on the Market cases are either 
dismissed at a preliminary stage or settled.”). 
62  See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle 9–10 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-03-02, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
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constitutes a circular payment from current shareholders to class-period 
shareholders. If a class-period shareholder held at least some of its shares 
after the fraud, one could argue that in participating in a securities class 
action it is de facto shifting money from its left pocket to its right, minus an 
attorney’s fee. There can be a similarly circular quality to payments made 
by publicly held underwriters and insurers, which may also be owned by 
diversified shareholders of the issuer. In the long run, the argument goes, a 
diversified shareholder will be as likely to pay into these settlements as it is 
to be compensated by them, netting out somewhere close to zero, minus 
attorneys’ fees. But recent work suggests that diversified investors can be 
harmed by fraud.63 One empirical study shows that numerous large, 
diversified institutional investors suffered substantial losses over a ten-year 
period from securities fraud.64 Moreover, the entire market could suffer a 
discount if fraud increases, thus harming investors.65 
Even if one concludes that diversified investors are not harmed by 
fraud, such investors should not necessarily be the focus of securities class 
actions because it is concentrated, informed investors who add unique value 
that is worthy of investor protection laws. For example, Jill Fisch notes that 
capital-market efficiency is promoted by informed traders.66 Informed 
traders research and analyze firm-specific information and then act on that 
information by trading.67 Such traders do the work of efficient markets that 
transparency alone cannot do—they incorporate public information into 
stock prices.68 To make a profit, informed traders must obtain returns that 
 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1785618 (noting that settlements are paid in substantial part by corporate 
or insurer rather than individual payments). 
63  Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 225 (2007) (“All 
investors, including diversified investors, can suffer substantial injury from securities fraud.”); James J. 
Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 341 (2009) (arguing that the 
entire market may suffer fraud discount if fraud increases, thus harming diversified investors). 
64 Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 223, 230 (2007) (citing 
ANJAN V. THAKOR ET AL., THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 12 
(2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/doc/the-economic-reality-of-securities-
class-action-litigation). 
65 James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 341 (2009) 
(arguing that the entire market may suffer fraud discount if fraud increases, thus harming diversified 
investors). 
66  See Fisch, supra note 60, at 347 (“[I]nformed traders are a critical component of the market that 
enables mandated disclosure to serve as a corporate-governance mechanism.”). For additional responses 
to the circularity problem, see Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When 
Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An 
Essay on Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243; 
and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
67  Fisch, supra note 60, at 347. 
68  See id. at 346–47. 
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exceed the costs of research and analysis.69 Therefore, they adopt 
undiversified (or concentrated) investment strategies.70 
In contrast, diversified investors seek “a market rate of return by 
eliminating firm-specific risk” (and reward).71 Perfectly diversified 
investors reduce to zero their incentives to engage in costly information 
gathering and analysis. While such passive diversified investing may be 
rational from the perspective of a particular investor, taken to an extreme it 
can be problematic for the market overall.72 Such investors freeload off of 
the market efficiency created by informed traders without compensating 
these traders for the costs of their research.73 
Because informed traders concentrate their risks and trade on 
information, they are likely to be net losers from fraud.74 Thus, securities 
fraud class actions compensate concentrated investors at the expense of 
insurance companies, underwriters, and diversified investors.75 Class actions 
constitute a form of insurance provided by diversified investors to informed 
traders in compensation for the positive externality of efficiency generated 
by these informed traders.76 
This rationale for securities class actions also supports the proposition 
that they should be led by at least one undiversified lead plaintiff, a role that 
would easily be inhabited here by an individual co-lead plaintiff. As is 
described further below, individual investors tend to be concentrated 
investors and if subjected to the screening process advocated in Part IV.A 
they will likely also be informed traders. In contrast, the large institutional 
investors that obtain lead plaintiff appointments tend to be more diversified 
than most investors; in fact, some of them are required to be diversified.77 
One need not embrace the view that concentrated, informed traders should 
 
69  Id. at 346 (“[F]or an investor to benefit from firm-specific research, the potential profit from that 
research must exceed the costs of research and analysis.”). 
70  See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069–70 (2007) (“Hedge funds, in contrast, do not see 
themselves as vehicles for diversification; they engage in targeted hedges, rather than diversification, to 
eliminate unwanted risk. More narrowly tailored strategies—such as activism—are thus more 
appropriate for hedge funds than for mutual funds.” (footnote omitted)); see also Fisch, supra note 60, at 
346–47 (“Thus, informed trading requires investors to limit their diversification and concentrate their 
holdings in a limited number of issuers.”). 
71  Fisch, supra note 60, at 346 (“The objective of diversification is to achieve a market rate of return 
by eliminating firm-specific risk.”). 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 347. 
74  Id. 
75  See id. 
76  See id. at 347–48. 
77  See, e.g., Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors 
in Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1404–05 (2001) (stating that institutional investors such as 
pension plans have affirmative duties under ERISA, such as diversifying the plan’s investments to 
decrease the risk of losses). 
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be the focus of securities class actions to recognize that, at a minimum, 
adding an undiversified voice to the lead plaintiff group will make it more 
representative of the class of fraud victims. 
B. Delaware Adopts a Lead Plaintiff Selection Process 
Modeled on the PSLRA 
In Hirt v. United States Timberlands Service Co.,78 the Delaware 
Chancery Court settled upon criteria for selecting lead plaintiffs modeled on 
the PSLRA procedure and Delaware’s own TCW Technology Ltd. 
Partnership v. Intermedia Communications, Inc.79 But in contrast to federal 
courts’ congressional mandate to favor lead plaintiffs with the largest 
absolute loss, Delaware’s “relative economic stakes” language has opened 
the possibility for selection of a lead plaintiff with the largest loss relative to 
its own assets. In Wiehl v. Eon Labs, Vice Chancellor Lamb encountered a 
dispute between competing lead plaintiffs over who should represent the 
class of shareholders.80 In so doing, he rejected the PSLRA approach of 
appointing the lead plaintiff with the largest absolute loss. “If every 
difference in economic stakes were given great weight, the court could 
simply add up the number of shares and select the law firm with the largest 
absolute representation. This is not Delaware law.”81 Vice Chancellor Lamb 
then compared the relative stakes of the competing plaintiffs, who held 
57,000 shares, 38,000 shares, and 1000 shares, respectively, noting that 
“[o]ne supposes that this investment [of 1000 shares] is of some 
significance to Huntsinger, an individual investor, and would cause him to 
monitor his counsels’ conduct of the litigation.”82 
More recently, in selecting lead plaintiffs and lead counsel in In re Del 
Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, Vice Chancellor Laster noted the 
size of lead-plaintiff applicants’ losses relative to their overall assets under 
management in selecting a lead plaintiff that had a smaller absolute but 
larger relative loss.83 This Article seeks to build on the principle suggested 
in Hirt and In re Del Monte—that the incentive to monitor class counsel 
stems, at least in part, from the relative size of the investor’s loss. The 
appointment of an individual co-lead plaintiff would almost certainly mean 
 
78  No. Civ.A. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002). 
79  No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (instituting system of selecting lead 
plaintiffs that is similar to PSLRA). 
80  No. Civ.A. 1116-N, 2005 WL 696764, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005). 
81  Id. at *3. Ultimately, as is frequently the approach to lead plaintiff disputes in Delaware, Vice 
Chancellor Lamb ordered the parties to settle it on their own. Id. at *4. But see, e.g., In re Del Monte 
Foods Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) 
(ordering submission of motions for appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel after failed efforts by 
attorneys to form leadership structure). 
82  Wiehl, 2005 WL 696764, at *3. 
83  2010 WL 5550677, at *6–7. 
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appointment of an individual whose losses are larger on a relative basis than 
that of its institutional co-lead and who presumably would be more 
motivated to seek a high settlement than the institution. 
C. The Search for a Motivated and Sophisticated Lead Plaintiff 
1. The Lead Plaintiff’s Motivation.—Consider two lead plaintiff 
applicants: an institutional investor with $100 billion in assets and a $1 
million loss and an individual with $1 million in assets and a $250,000 loss. 
Under current practice, the institution will be selected lead plaintiff. Who 
has greater incentive to zealously monitor class counsel? Some might argue 
that the institutional investor does. First, the institution has the most to gain 
from monitoring in absolute terms. On account of its experience and legal 
acumen, it may also be able to monitor less expensively than an individual 
can. On the other hand, institutions have agency costs that individuals do 
not. Manager performance is based on measures that affect the institution’s 
bottom line, including total assets, returns on investment, and growth of the 
overall portfolio.84 Managers will concentrate their attention and expertise 
on firm activities that contribute most to these measures, and that likely 
excludes litigation over losses in one particular security.85 
Consider recent research demonstrating the failure by institutional 
investors to claim billions of dollars set aside for them in class action 
settlements. In an empirical study whose results are as astonishing as they 
are depressing, James Cox and Randall Thomas found that, on average, just 
28% of eligible institutional investors filed claims in settled securities class 
actions.86 The institutions’ average loss in these cases was $850,000 and the 
average available recovery was $280,000.87 All these institutions needed to 
do to recover these funds was fill out a claim form and mail it in. Failure to 
do so breached the institutions’ fiduciary duties to their investors.88 In an 
attempt to explain these lapses, Cox and Thomas noted: 
 
84  See, e.g., Jonathan B. Berk & Richard Stanton, Managerial Ability, Compensation, and the 
Closed-End Fund Discount, 62 J. FIN. 529, 530–31 (2007) (discussing types of manager compensation 
and performance measures). 
85  See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: 
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in 
Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412 (2005) (finding that large financial 
institutions frequently do not make claims on money owed from class action litigation); see also Charles 
Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud 
Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471, 481 (2008) (discussing high opportunity costs for institutional 
investors who serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions). 
86  Cox & Thomas, supra note 85, at 424. 
87  Id. at 424–25. 
88  See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors 
Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 867, 879 (2002) (noting 
noncollection could be a potential breach of fiduciary duty). 
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[I]nstitutional managers who . . . assess the desirability of identifying and 
submitting claims in the context of the overall activities of the fund can easily 
conclude that there are far better places to expend the fund’s resources. That is, 
managers who view their objective as being well-performing traders (i.e., 
beating the market) are less likely to value operations that are removed from 
that role. For example, a few fund managers commented rather casually to us 
that they did not value submitting claims because the expected gains of doing 
so were dwarfed by both the size of the fund’s assets and the average yearly 
returns earned by the fund through wise investment strategies.89 
Concededly, institutional investors who obtain lead plaintiff 
appointments have incurred large losses that attracted their attention to the 
fraud (or attracted the lawyers’ attention to the fraud) and have committed 
to the litigation in a way that differentiates them from the passive 
institutional investors described in the Cox and Thomas paper. But their 
commitment should not be overstated. As noted earlier, institutions are 
frequently alerted to their losses by the plaintiffs’ law firms that monitor 
their portfolios.90 It is possible that, even though these losses are large 
enough to qualify them for lead plaintiff appointments, they might never act 
on them on their own because of their relative triviality on the balance 
sheet. Litigating these losses remains outside the managers’ core 
competencies, and a successful outcome adds little to the fund’s bottom 
line. Oversight of the suit may be assigned to peripheral personnel within 
the institution.91 And the institution may also defer to those who alerted 
them to the loss in the first place—those who have the greatest interest in 
the outcome of the suit and the greatest expertise—the lawyers. This 
delegation might occur despite the fact that under the class action system, 
the courts charge lead plaintiffs with the responsibility to monitor the 
attorneys rather than allowing attorneys to police themselves. 
The purpose of this argument is not to impugn institutional investor 
lead plaintiffs who have, in many respects, improved outcomes for 
shareholders since embracing pursuit of securities class actions at the 
beginning of the last decade.92 It is to demonstrate that consideration of the 
fraud’s impact relative to the total assets of the lead plaintiff may signify 
 
89  Cox & Thomas, supra note 85, at 431 (footnote omitted). 
90  Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 219 (noting that monitoring firms alert institutional investors to 
potential suits). 
91  Cox & Thomas, supra note 85, at 432 (“There is also the distinct possibility that breakdowns 
occur within the institution or the custodian. Lines of authority, once clearly established, may, with the 
passage of time and personnel, become blurred or forgotten. One can imagine that institutions or 
custodians could assign to one of their staffers responsibility for handling all matters related to the 
institution’s possible securities claims.”). 
92  See, e.g., 2009 Securities Litigation Study, PWC SEC. LITIG. STUDY (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
LLP, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 2010, at 22, available at http://10b5.pwc.com/pdf/ny-10-
0559%20sec%20lit%20study_v7%20print.pdf (“[N]ine of the top ten settlements reached in 2009 had 
institutional investors as the lead plaintiff.”). 
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the plaintiff’s motivation to monitor class counsel and maximize class 
recovery. This relative impact should not be the only consideration. No one 
wants lead plaintiffs who lost all $28.34 of their net worth in one stock 
fraud; substantial absolute losses remain probative of lead plaintiff interest, 
effort, and sophistication. But it remains true that for institutional investors, 
most stock frauds are rounding errors. For individuals, they can be life-
altering experiences.93 
Skeptics might argue that it is not enough for individual lead plaintiffs 
to have incurred high losses on a relative or absolute basis. Such plaintiffs 
must believe that the increased recovery they can obtain by personally 
serving as lead plaintiffs will outweigh the costs of service (notwithstanding 
that they are entitled to reimbursement of reasonable costs and expenses).94 
Their optimal position would be to free ride off the efforts of other 
sophisticated and motivated individual lead plaintiffs. Of course, the same 
arguments hold for institutional lead plaintiffs, whose interests might be 
optimally served through appointment of another sophisticated institutional 
lead plaintiff. Nevertheless, institutional investors comprise 40% of all lead 
plaintiffs.95 
This may be because lead plaintiff applicants, whether they be 
institutions or individuals, are not motivated by purely economic interests in 
deciding to take part in litigation. In addition to believing that they can 
improve settlements to their own benefit, lead plaintiff applicants may be 
motivated to serve by a sense of moral and civic duty to act in the face of 
fraud.96 As Bobby Deal, a sheriff and board member of the repeat-lead-
plaintiff Jacksonville Police and Fire Pension Fund once told me: “Half of 
my guys carry axes, and the other half carry guns. We put bad guys in jail 
for a living. We are not about to sit back and let someone steal from our 
members and the investing public.”97 Just as an individual who serves on 
the board of an institution may be motivated to vote in favor of seeking a 
lead-plaintiff appointment by a sense of personal outrage in the face of 
 
93  See, e.g., In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2001) 
(declining to appoint as lead plaintiff an individual who lost $1.9 million in the alleged fraud, a “very 
substantial portion” of his family’s net worth, instead appointing the Florida State Board of 
Administration with losses of $2.3 million on total assets under management of $125.6 billion). 
94  Under the PSLRA, lead plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement of “reasonable costs and 
expenses.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) (2006). Still, some potential applicants may prefer not to incur even 
reimbursable expenses devoted to litigation. 
95  See 2003 Securities Litigation Study, supra note 46, at 6. For a more in-depth discussion of 
institutional investor participation as lead plaintiffs in state-level transactional class actions, which have 
many parallels to securities fraud class actions, see Webber, supra note 7 ( section entitled “Basic 
Statistics—Institutional Lead Plaintiff Characteristics”). 
96  David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class 
Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2071 (2010). 
97  Id. In Part IV.A, I discuss some cases in which apparently qualified individual investors have 
applied for lead plaintiff appointments but were rejected in favor of institutions. 
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fraud, individual investors acting on their own behalf might be similarly 
motivated. 
2. The Sophistication of the Lead Plaintiff.—Ideally, in addition to 
being motivated, a lead plaintiff should also be sufficiently sophisticated to 
manage class counsel.98 There is, however, some controversy about this 
point too. Some courts have noted that Congress’s adoption of the “largest 
financial interest” test meant that Congress did not in fact value 
sophistication as an important quality in a lead plaintiff.99 But these courts 
were addressing cases in which institutional investors challenged an 
individual’s presumptive lead plaintiff status, charging that the individual 
lacked the requisite sophistication to be lead plaintiff.100 That these courts 
refused to override the largest financial interest requirement in favor of the 
purportedly superior sophistication of the institutions does not mean that 
sophistication is not a valued factor in selecting lead plaintiffs. Two circuit 
courts of appeals and one district court in the Southern District of New 
York—the most frequent venue for securities class actions—have noted that 
the quest for a sophisticated lead plaintiff is one of the purposes of the 
PSLRA.101 Arguably, the PSLRA standard creating a presumption favoring 
selection of the applicant with the largest loss implicitly prioritizes 
 
98  In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 192 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Thus the PSLRA strives to 
ensure that the lead plaintiff will have both the incentive and the capability to supervise its counsel in the 
best interests of the class.”). For a more general discussion of the adequacy of representation of lead 
plaintiffs in class actions, see Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
1136, 1151 (2009) (describing the doctrine of adequate representation as handling two distinct problems: 
the “incompetence” and “indifference” of lead plaintiffs). 
99  In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 737 n.20 (9th Cir. 2002) (“If financial sophistication had been 
Congress’ principal concern, it would not have made the plaintiff who lost the most money the 
presumptive lead plaintiff.”). 
100  See, e.g., Zhu v. UCBH Holdings, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (declining 
to appoint an institutional lead plaintiff over an individual lead plaintiff with a larger stake, even though 
the individual may have been less sophisticated than the institution); Tanne v. Autobytel, Inc., 226 
F.R.D. 659, 670 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Although the PSLRA was enacted to encourage institutional 
investors to take a more active role in securities litigation, the Ninth Circuit has held that it does not 
require[ ] the district court to select the plaintiff it believes is the most sophisticated investor available. 
As a consequence, there is no per se rule requiring that an institutional investor be appointed lead 
plaintiff in lieu of an individual who has a larger stake in the litigation.” (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
101  See Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 279 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“[W]e mean 
to emphasize that Congress enacted the ‘lead plaintiff’ provisions of the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(B), to direct courts to appoint, as lead plaintiff, the most sophisticated investor available and 
willing so to serve in a putative securities class action.”); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 266 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he goal of the Reform Act’s lead plaintiff provision is to locate a person or entity 
whose sophistication and interest in the litigation are sufficient to permit that person or entity to function 
as an active agent for the class.”); In re EVCI Career Colls. Holding Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 
10240(CM), 2007 WL 2230177, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007) (“The PSLRA was enacted in part to 
ensure that sophisticated institutional investors . . . would participate in and control securities 
litigation.”). 
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sophistication in a lead plaintiff. The entities with the largest losses are not 
just institutions, but often the very largest institutions, who are most likely 
to be both financially and legally sophisticated. 
What constitutes sophistication sufficient for lead plaintiff purposes 
remains hazy. The few courts that have addressed the issue suggest that it is 
a combination of financial and legal sophistication, with evidence of the 
former regularly taken as evidence of the latter. In addition to judging a lead 
plaintiff’s acumen by reference to which law firm it selected as lead 
counsel, courts have concluded that individual investors making substantial 
securities decisions—such as trading in tens of thousands of shares102 or 
serving as officers or directors of private companies103—have the 
sophistication necessary to serve as lead plaintiffs in a securities class 
action. Institutional investors, on the other hand, tend to be viewed as per se 
sophisticated.104 
The prospect of appointing individual-investor lead plaintiffs raises the 
concern that individuals who suffer relatively large losses—who may be 
among the least diversified members of the class—may not be sophisticated 
enough for the job. Put bluntly, could individuals with large losses be the 
biggest buffoons in the class? They might be. For example, they might have 
irrationally invested their life savings in one stock. In theory, such plaintiffs 
could still furnish some value to the class; the institution could provide the 
sophistication and these foolish individuals the motivation. But it is just as 
likely, perhaps more likely, that such individuals are former employees who 
amassed significant shareholdings in the course of their employment or are 
the heirs of such employees. Or it may be that they are sophisticated 
individuals who believed in the company and relied on the integrity of its 
public filings to take a calculated risk to aggressively invest in what turned 
out to be a fraudulent enterprise. A core mission of securities enforcement 
generally, including securities class actions, is to ensure that mere reliance 
on the integrity of our system of disclosure does not itself become a mark of 
an investor’s lack of sophistication.105 In the next Part, I survey the finance 
literature on individual investors, including individual investors who pursue 
the kinds of concentrated investment strategies that could make them 
motivated candidates for lead-plaintiff appointments. The purpose of this 
review is to dispel the notion that individual investors, even those pursuing 
 
102  See, e.g., Ferrari v. Gisch, 225 F.R.D. 599, 609 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (appointing a three-person lead 
plaintiff group who purchased 20,000 shares, 11,600 shares, and 897 shares, respectively). 
103  See, e.g., Mohanty v. BigBand Networks, Inc., No. C 07-5101 SBA, 2008 WL 426250, at *9 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (appointing a lead plaintiff because, in part, of his work on boards “of both 
privately held and NASDAQ listed companies”). 
104  See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1029 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(finding a bank to be a sophisticated investor); Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1152–53 (concluding there 
should be a “conclusive presumption” that all institutional investors are sophisticated). 
105  See generally Fletcher, supra note 30, at 1149–53 (discussing investor sophistication, or lack 
thereof). 
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such strategies, are per se unsophisticated and therefore unsuited for even 
cursory consideration as lead plaintiffs. 
II. ARE INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS INHERENTLY UNSOPHISTICATED? 
SURVEYING THE CURRENT FINANCE LITERATURE 
Historically, individual investors have fared poorly in the finance 
literature, securing a reputation for being “at best uninformed, at worst 
fools.”106 Brad Barber and Terrance Odean report that an average individual 
investor owns just four stocks,107 and several studies suggest that the 
portfolios of American households are underdiversified.108 A recent study 
by William Goetzmann and Alok Kumar concludes that U.S. individual 
investors hold underdiversified portfolios in which the level of 
underdiversification “is greater among younger, low-income, less-educated, 
and less-sophisticated investors. The level of under-diversification is also 
correlated with investment choices that are consistent with over-confidence, 
trend-following behavior, and local bias.”109 Frequent explanations for 
individual investors’ underdiversification include a lack of sophistication 
and the fact that they incur transaction fees when actively trading their own 
stocks.110 
But a fair reading of the current finance literature presents a more 
complex picture of individual investors. Even Goetzmann and Kumar report 
the “most surprising” result that high-turnover, underdiversified portfolios 
outperform high-turnover, better-diversified portfolios, indicating that “a 
small, active group of under-diversified investors might be skilled.”111 And 
while they still conclude that most investors could improve their 
performance by simply investing in passive, diversified index funds, they 
 
106  See, e.g., Coval, Hirshleifer & Shumway, supra note 2, at 6. 
107  Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock 
Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 796 (2000). 
108  See, e.g., Marshall E. Blume & Irwin Friend, The Asset Structure of Individual Portfolios and 
Some Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J. FIN., 585 (1975); Morgan Kelly, All Their Eggs in One 
Basket: Portfolio Diversification of US Households, 27 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 87 (1995); Ronald C. 
Lease, Wilbur G. Lewellen & Gary G. Schlarbaum, The Individual Investor: Attributes and Attitudes, 
29 J. FIN. 413, 429–31 (1974) (explaining that the individual investor tends to invest almost entirely in 
equity securities to the exclusion of other asset categories). 
109  William N. Goetzmann & Alok Kumar, Equity Portfolio Diversification, 12 REV. FIN. 433, 449–
52 (2008). (“[W]ealthier, more experienced, and financially sophisticated investors and those who 
exhibit a stronger propensity to diversify in other settings hold relatively better diversified stock 
portfolios. . . . At least three psychological biases could be associated with investors’ diversification 
choices, [including] over-confidence in their investment abilities, . . . stronger propensity to hold local 
stocks, [and] . . . greater sensitivity to past price trends.”). 
110  See Barber & Odean, supra note 107, at 776 (finding that the costs and frequency of trading 
damaged the amount of individuals’ portfolio returns). 
111  Goetzmann & Kumar, supra note 109, at 435. 
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also conclude that “some investors under-diversify because they might have 
superior private information.”112 
Current financial scholarship supports this notion that there are 
undiversified yet skilled individual investors who outperform the market. 
Zoran Ivković, Clemens Sialm, and Scott Weisbrenner’s study of individual 
investors concludes that “among households with portfolios large enough to 
diversify among many stocks, if desired, the holdings and trades made by 
those focusing their attention on a few securities tend to perform 
significantly better than the investments made by those diversifying across 
many stocks.”113 They further conclude that “wealthy households who 
concentrate their holdings in a few stocks tend to have the ability to identify 
superior stock picks.”114 Their data show, inter alia, that purchases made by 
diversified investors of any portfolio size underperform the Fama/French 
benchmark portfolios,115 as do concentrated households with small 
portfolios.116 However, concentrated households with large portfolios 
exceed Fama/French benchmark portfolios by 1.3% for those with 
relatively large portfolios (defined as at least $25,000) and by 2.2% for 
those with large portfolios (defined as at least $100,000).117 At least some 
individual investors outperform the market for some period of time. 
Such skilled investors “exploit information asymmetries by 
concentrating their portfolios in the stocks about which they have favorable 
information.”118 Earlier articles by Ivković and Weisbenner and by Massimo 
Massa and Andrei Simonov demonstrate that individual investments in 
local stocks outperform their investments in nonlocal stocks, that investors 
exhibit a strong tendency to hold stocks in companies to which they are 
geographically or professionally close, and that such investments earn, on 
average, excess returns.119 Thus, Ivković, Sialm, and Weisbenner suggest 
 
112  Id. at 461. 
113  Zoran Ivković, Clemens Sialm & Scott Weisbenner, Portfolio Concentration and the 
Performance of Individual Investors, 43 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 613, 653 (2008) (emphasis 
added). 
114  Id. 
115  The Fama/French Benchmark Portfolios are six single-asset-class portfolios categorized by 
market equity and book-to-market ratio against which other portfolios may be compared. See Kenneth 
R. French, Description of Fama/French Benchmark Portfolios, KENNETH R. FRENCH, 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_portfolios.html (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2012). 
116  Ivković, Sialm & Wiesbenner, supra note 113, at 616. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 617; see also Zoran Ivković & Scott Weisbenner, Local Does as Local Is: Information 
Content of the Geography of Individual Investors’ Common Stock Investments, 60 J. FIN. 267, 267 
(2005) (“Behold, the fool saith, ‘Put not all thine eggs in the one basket’—which is but a manner of 
saying, ‘Scatter your money and your attention’; but the wise man saith, ‘Put all your eggs in the one 
basket and—watch that basket.’” (quoting Mark Twain)). 
119  Ivković & Weisbenner, supra note 118, at 268–69; Massimo Massa & Andrei Simonov, 
Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 633, 667–69 (2006). 
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that at least some underdiversification or concentration may be driven not 
by typical hallmarks of the unsophisticated investor, such as familiarity bias 
or overconfidence, but by favorable information, particularly in the form of 
local investment.120 
Joshua Coval, David Hirshleifer, and Tyler Shumway echo a similar 
theme. Using a large sample of accounts at a major discount brokerage firm, 
they test the persistence of individual performance results evaluating both 
long horizons (the holding period for the investment) and short horizons 
(average returns the week after each purchase).121 Their results demonstrate, 
inter alia, that for the long horizon, investors in the top performance decile 
outperform those in the bottom decile by about 8% per year.122 Over the 
short horizon, individual investors in the top decile earn between twelve 
and fifteen basis points a day; individuals in the bottom decile lose between 
eleven and twelve basis points per day.123 As the authors note, “If those 
individual investors who have performed abnormally well in the past 
continue to perform abnormally well in the future by an amount that is not 
explained by mere chance, market efficiency may be violated.”124 In 
explanation, the authors note that these consistently high-performing 
individual investors may be better able to exploit informational advantages 
than, say, mutual fund managers (whose abnormal performance typically 
lags behind the market overall). For example, because these individual 
investors trade small positions, their trades have little if any impact on 
prices, allowing them to better exploit smaller or short-term deviations from 
fundamental values.125 Moreover, unlike mutual funds, individuals are not 
obliged to maintain diversified investment portfolios.126 
The presence of sophisticated and concentrated individual investors in 
the marketplace does not mean they are to be found as class members in 
every—or, in theory, in any—class action or that they would be willing to 
serve as lead plaintiffs. Nor are such investors identical to the potential 
individual lead plaintiffs outlined above, whose losses, relative to their total 
assets, are high. The concentrated investors described in the finance 
literature have not necessarily invested a large percentage of their net worth 
in one stock (or a few stocks); rather, they have invested a large percentage 
of their portfolio in one stock (or a few stocks). It is possible that their 
portfolio represents a small percentage of their overall assets. It is possible 
that on account of their sophistication, they are much less likely to be 
defrauded, although to believe this one would have to believe that they 
 
120  Ivković, Sialm & Weisbenner, supra note 113, at 617. 
121  Coval, Hirshleifer & Shumway, supra note 2, at 3. 
122  Id. at 5. 
123  Id. at 4. 
124  Id. at 1. 
125  Id. at 7. 
126  Id. 
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know of or can detect the fraud before the rest of the market. Despite these 
positive indicators that there are many savvy individual investors out there, 
it is possible that a rule favoring an individual co-lead plaintiff who 
suffered the largest relative loss would hand a leadership role to the biggest 
fool in the class (though the judicial screening of such plaintiffs proposed 
below should eliminate this possibility). Of course, it is also possible that 
sophisticated, concentrated investors who have invested a substantial 
portion of their assets in one stock or a few stocks and were defrauded 
would like to obtain lead plaintiff appointments and would make excellent 
lead plaintiffs for the class as a whole (and in particular, for individual 
investors), but have no chance to obtain a leadership role under the current 
system, even if they wanted to. 
The point of reviewing the finance literature is not to suggest that such 
ideal individual investors may be found to co-lead every class action 
(though with classes composed of thousands or tens of thousands of 
investors, there likely would be some candidates). It is to respond to the 
view that individual investors, particularly concentrated ones, are per se 
unsophisticated, need to be protected from themselves, and cannot serve as 
guardians for other investors. As a group, individual investors may 
underperform institutional investors, but that does not automatically make 
institutional investors the optimal class representatives. The finance 
literature suggests that some concentrated individual investors are 
sophisticated; basic economic and psychological principles suggest they are 
likely to be highly motivated. The question of whether it is worthwhile to 
invest the small effort required to open a co-lead plaintiff appointment to 
individuals requires an assessment of why institutional investors may not 
adequately represent individuals. 
III. THE POTENTIALLY MISALIGNED INTERESTS OF INDIVIDUAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s Typicality and Adequacy 
Requirements 
It is a bedrock principle of American law, one that has been repeatedly 
(and recently) reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, that a person cannot be 
bound to a judgment in a court proceeding to which she was not a party.127 
That principle has been strained but not broken by the rise of the modern 
class action.128 Among the modern concessions embodied in Rule 23 was 
the grouping together of claims into a class action simply because it was 
 
127  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 906 (2008) (stating that under agency law, “preclusion is 
appropriate only if the putative agent’s conduct of the suit is subject to the control of the party who is 
bound by the prior adjudication”). 
128  See, e.g., ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 80–83. 
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more efficient to resolve similar claims in one unified case.129 Specifically, 
Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification of a class upon a determination that 
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.”130 Words like “predominate” and “superior” allow for the 
inclusion of overlapping but not identical claims in the class action 
mechanism for efficiency purposes.131 Virtually all securities class actions 
are brought under this mechanism.132 Ordinarily, because only parties that 
actually participate in a lawsuit are bound by the judgment, Rule 23 
requires the trial court to inquire directly into the adequacy of the 
representation that absent class members will be afforded by a prospective 
lead plaintiff.133 
Rule 23(a)(3) requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative 
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and Rule 23(a)(4) 
requires that the named parties “will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.”134 The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves 
“to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they 
seek to represent.”135 This adequacy inquiry has heightened importance in 
the context of Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions because such actions by 
definition encompass claims by absent class members that may not align 
perfectly with those of the lead plaintiffs. A party may be bound to a 
judgment in which it arguably had no meaningful opportunity to participate 
as long as the representative plaintiff was just that—representative of class 
members.136 By asserting claims that are typical of the class’s claims and by 
furnishing adequate representation of those claims in terms of competent, 
supervised counsel, the class’s interests are actually represented in the court 
proceeding to which they will be bound.137 As a further procedural 
 
129  Id. at 83. 
130  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
131  See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 86. 
132  see also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: 
Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 30 (2007) (“Plaintiffs in securities 
class actions generally proceed under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . .”); cf. ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 82 (“[T]he 
1966 reforms to Rule 23 brought to life a range of economic harm cases that were almost unimaginable 
previously, as with securities class actions.). 
133  ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 80. 
134  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3)–(4). 
135  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625–26 (1997) (“[A] class representative must 
be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” 
(quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974))). 
136  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (stating the class action requirements); G. Chin Chao, Securities Class 
Actions and Due Process, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 547, 559 (noting that Rule 23(b)(3) class 
members are bound by res judicata if they do not opt out of the class). 
137  See Chao, supra note 136, at 558 (discussing certification of a class action under Rule 23); see 
also ISSACHAROFF, supra note 9, at 79 (“For those whose rights are to be decided in absentia the critical 
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safeguard for the rights of absent class members, these members retain the 
right to opt out of the class action and bring their own suit.138 However, as a 
practical matter, because many claims made by individual investors are 
negative-value claims, opting out is rarely an economically feasible 
option.139 Either they will obtain a remedy for the losses through a class 
action, or they will obtain no remedy at all. 
The ensuing sections discuss four conflicts between institutional and 
individual investors that implicate Rule 23, including: (1) derivatives 
trading, (2) selling versus holding shareholders, (3) corporate governance 
activism, and (4) state-level transactional litigation in which institutional 
investors hold a stake in both the acquirer and the target. Although I will 
argue that these conflicts largely break down along institutional versus 
individual lines, they do not do so perfectly. There may be individuals who 
trade derivatives or pursue corporate governance activism while there may 
be institutions that do neither or that hold a stake only in a target company 
in a litigation. Taking a purist approach, one could transform the lead 
plaintiff group into a noisy parliament by separately selecting lead plaintiffs 
for derivatives traders, sellers, holders, class members seeking corporate 
governance reform, 10b-5 claimants, § 11 claimants, etc., increasing the 
group’s size and reducing its cohesiveness, perhaps solving these conflicts 
without reference to the institutional–individual dichotomy at all. 
But maintaining this dichotomy as an analytical framework for 
intraclass conflicts retains several advantages. First, much of securities 
regulation as currently constituted makes distinctions between institutional 
and individual investors. Second, the institutional–individual dichotomy 
reflects not just the law, but also the reality of the marketplace. Institutions 
and individuals trade through different brokerage platforms and may even 
pay different prices for the same securities.140 Finally, because these 
 
due process issue is the quality of the representation that was afforded. It is the adequacy of that 
representation that allows this extraordinary departure from the conventional rule that each individual is 
entitled to his or her own opportunity to control any litigation that threatens to impose liability or 
terminate a claim.”). 
138  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v); Chao, supra note 136, at 574–75 (“[T]he current practice is to 
require notice and an opportunity to appear or to opt out only for (b)(3) classes while (b)(1) and (b)(2) 
classes receive notice only in certain instances such as settlements.”). 
139  See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action 
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532–33 (2004) (discussing rarity 
of opt-outs and objectors in class actions). 
140  See Graham Bowley, Stock Exchange Shrinks as Rivals Take Over Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2009, at A1 (noting the existence of “dark pools” and their availability to institutional investors only). 
Compare Contact Us, BLOOMBERG TRADEBOOK, http://www.bloombergtradebook.com/landing (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2012) (“Please note that Bloomberg Tradebook is only available for institutional 
trading.”), and Electronic Trading Services, MF GLOBAL, http://www.mfglobal.com/equities/electronic-
trading-services (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (“MF Global’s team of electronic trading professionals 
provides execution and clearing services to institutional clients.”), with About Us, E*TRADE, 
https://us.etrade.com/e/t/home/aboutus (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (“[E*TRADE] empower[s] 
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conflicts tend to break down along institutional and individual lines, 
selection of one additional (individual) lead plaintiff who has been properly 
screened for these conflicts allows a court to solve several of them with just 
one additional appointment. For these reasons, this Article maintains the 
institutional–individual dichotomy in analyzing intraclass conflicts in 
securities class actions. 
B. Conflicts Between Institutional and Individual Investors 
1. Derivatives Trading and Lead Plaintiff Appointments.—
Derivatives trading and the failure to properly account for it causes two 
problems with regard to the lead plaintiff selection process. The first 
problem is that omission of derivatives from the largest financial interest 
calculation may lead to the appointment of lead plaintiff applicants who do 
not actually have the largest financial interest in the litigation.141 
Theoretically, they may even have a negative interest in it. The second 
problem is that derivatives trading, when accounted for properly, raises 
unique defenses that may render derivatives traders atypical and inadequate 
class representatives. The current treatment of derivatives 
disproportionately harms individual investors who stand to benefit most 
from resolution of these conflicts. 
a. Calculation of the Largest Financial Interest.—Derivatives 
are financial instruments such as put options, call options, and equity swaps 
whose value derives from the value of an underlying asset.142 Some 
derivatives are defined as securities in both the Securities Act of 1933143 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.144 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, the United States Supreme Court noted that the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 treats such derivative investors as purchasers or sellers of 
 
individuals to take control of their financial futures by providing the products, tools and services they 
need to meet their near- and long-term investing goals.”). 
141  See Mohanty v. BigBand Networks, Inc., No. C 07-5101 SBA, 2008 WL 426250, at *6–7 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 14, 2008) (“[D]istrict courts typically equate ‘largest financial interest’ with the amount of 
potential recovery.” (citing In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107–08 (N.D. 
Cal. 2001)). 
142  See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 334–36 (11th ed. 2009) (discussing treatment of derivatives, particularly swaps, under 
securities laws). 
143  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means any note, 
stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, . . . or . . . any put, call, straddle, [or] 
option . . . .”). 
144  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2006) (“The term ‘security’ means 
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, . . . or any put, call, straddle, [or] 
option . . . .”). 
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securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5.145 Subsequently, the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) amended Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act to cover “security-based swap agreements,” 
although it simultaneously exempted such agreements from the registration 
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.146 
More recently, Title VII of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank) was passed to provide for 
comprehensive regulation of previously unregulated swaps and security-
based swap agreements.147 Some securities-based swap agreements will now 
be cleared through clearinghouses rather than traded over-the-counter via 
bilateral agreements whose infamous opaqueness was at least partly 
responsible for the financial panic of 2008.148 Dodd–Frank instructed the 
appropriate regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission and, more relevantly for purposes of this Article, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), to issue rules designating which swap 
agreements required clearance and which could continue to be traded over-
 
145  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 (1975) (“[T]he holders of puts, 
calls, options, and other contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities have been recognized 
as ‘purchasers’ or ‘sellers’ of securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5 . . . .”); id. at 750–51 (citing 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (defining “buy” or “purchase” as including contracts to “buy, purchase, or otherwise 
acquire”) and § 78c(a)(14) (defining terms “sale” and “sell” to include contracts “to sell or otherwise 
dispose of”)). 
146  Pub. L. No. 106-554, § E302-03, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-451 to 454; see also Caiola v. Citibank, 
N.A., 295 F.3d 312, 327 (2d Cir. 2002) (implying that prior to passage of CFMA, some derivatives such 
as equity swaps were neither registered as securities nor subject to the antifraud provisions of the 
securities laws). 
147  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 763(g), 
124 Stat. 1376, 1777–78 (2010) (amending Section 9 of the Exchange Act); see also New Rules for 




148  Press Release, House Democratic Comm. on Fin. Servs., In the Wake of Global Debt Crises, 
House Democrats Call for Implementation of Reforms in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (June 29, 2011), available at http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/press/
PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=1427 (“The lack of transparency—particularly in derivatives markets—was a 
major cause of the recent crisis and remains a clear and present danger to the financial system.”); see 
also New Rules for Derivatives, supra note 147, at 2 (“The effort to require central clearing and 
exchange trading for many derivative actions is at the heart of two basic purposes of the [Dodd–Frank] 
Act—reducing systemic risk and increasing market transparency.”). 
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the-counter as they were prior to Dodd–Frank.149 This rulemaking process 
was scheduled for completion in July 2011, though it remains ongoing.150 
Undoubtedly, many derivatives that previously traded over the counter 
will now be cleared.151 Clearing will provide transparent pricing that will, 
among other things, simplify the calculation of investors’ exposure to 
securities fraud or pending transactions.152 As discussed below, whether it is 
because of the pre-Dodd–Frank (and hopefully not post-Dodd–Frank) 
complexity of calculating such exposure or some other reason, lead plaintiff 
applicants have often failed to plead, and courts have failed to include, 
derivatives in the calculation of the “largest financial interest” for lead 
plaintiff purposes. This omission is important, chiefly because a lead 
plaintiff’s derivatives exposure affects its incentives to maximize recovery. 
There are two legal impediments to including derivatives in calculation 
of the largest financial interest. The first is the traditional notion that the 
plaintiff is the “master of his complaint” and may therefore decide what 
claims to include in it.153 If the “master” excludes derivatives from the 
complaint, deliberately or otherwise, then derivatives almost certainly 
won’t be incorporated into the case (even if an ideal social planner would 
 
149  New Rules for Derivatives, supra note 147, at 2–3; see also Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial 
Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 297302 
(2011) (discussing OTC derivatives, the role they have played in the global financial collapse, and the 
difficulty of regulating them). 
150  See Dodd-Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK 2–4 (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/FIG/072211_Dodd_Frank_Progress_Report.pdf (noting July 
2011 implementation deadline and the SEC’s failure to meet it in several categories); see also 
Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—Upcoming Activity, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml (last 
modified Mar. 24, 2012) (setting forth schedule for further implementation of Dodd–Frank by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission). 
151  See Press Release, House Democratic Comm. on Fin. Servs., supra note 148 ( “The [Dodd–
Frank Act] brings the derivatives markets out of the shadows by requiring reporting of all swap 
transactions and by requiring exchange-trading and central clearing for most of them.” (emphasis 
added)). 
152  See The Monitor, 29 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., May 2010, at 29–30 (“To promote 
public transparency, standard over-the-counter derivatives should be traded on exchanges or other 
trading platforms. The more transparent a marketplace, the more liquid it is, the more competitive it is, 
and the lower the costs for companies that use derivatives to hedge risk. Transparency brings better 
pricing and lowers risk for all parties to a derivatives transaction. During the financial crisis, Wall Street 
and the Federal Government had no price reference for particular assets. Financial reform is incomplete 
without public market transparency.”); see also Derivatives—Protection Without Suffocation: Thriving 
in a New Era of Regulatory and Market Transformation, BNY MELLON 4 (May 2010), 
http://www.bnymellon.com/foresight/pdf/derivatives.pdf (“Central clearing has been shown to increase 
transparency and reduce a variety of risks for OTC derivatives markets.”). 
153  Matthew O’Brien, Choice of Forum in Securities Class Actions: Confronting “Reform” of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 28 REV. LITIG. 845, 895 (2009) (citing Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08CV04035, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76322, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2008) (noting plaintiff’s right to plead only claims 
under the Securities Act of 1933 in securities litigation because “a plaintiff is the master of his 
complaint”), rev’d on other grounds, 552 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 186 
include them) unless the “master” changes her mind or some other 
derivatives complainant appears. The second, related impediment is the 
unique timeline of securities class actions, in which the lead plaintiff is 
selected based on the value of her claims in a complaint that may easily be 
changed afterwards to include different claims. Therefore, whether 
derivative claimants will ultimately be included in the class may not be 
known until after the lead plaintiff has been selected. In short, it is never 
certain that derivatives will be included in the case or, even if they are 
ultimately included, that they will be taken into consideration at the lead 
plaintiff selection stage. 
As to the first point, plaintiffs are the “masters of the complaint” and 
may select the claims presented.154 Thus, if a securities class action plaintiff 
chooses to claim only for losses related to the common stock, even if that 
plaintiff (or others) has losses in preferred stock or derivatives, the court 
will not force the plaintiff to add claims for preferred stock or derivatives. 
When applicants move for lead plaintiff status, the PSLRA requires merely 
that they disclose their transactions “in the security that is the subject of the 
complaint.”155 Thus, the court or the class may never know what other 
securities the lead-plaintiff applicants bought or sold during the class 
period. This Article will address the consequences of this below. 
The second legal impediment relates to the timeline of securities class 
actions. In most securities class actions, a plaintiffs’ law firm representing 
an individual with a small financial stake files the initial complaint.156 Such 
complaints tend to be filed within days after the fraud has been revealed.157 
The initial plaintiff must then publish, in a “widely circulated national 
business-oriented publication or wire service,” notice of the pendency of the 
action advising class members that they have sixty days to seek the lead 
plaintiff appointment.158 As a matter of practice, when institutional investors 
move for lead plaintiff appointments, they do so within this sixty-day 
window, typically taking several weeks to assess their exposure to the 
fraud, the merits of the case, and the costs and benefits of obtaining the 
 
154  See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 23 (2009). 
155  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (2006) (emphasis added). 
156  See, e.g., John F. Olson, David C. Mahaffey & Brian E. Casey, Pleading Reform, Plaintiff 
Qualification and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 1101, 1142–43 (1996) 
(discussing the use of professional plaintiffs, who have a relatively small stake in the litigation, to 
expedite filing a case). 
157  See, e.g., id. at 1104–05 (citing In re Philip Morris Sec. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 97, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995), aff’d in part, rev’d and remanded in part, 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that plaintiffs filed 
the initial complaint fewer than five hours after Philip Morris’s announcement, with four more suits filed 
that day and five more filed the following day)). 
158  § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i). 
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appointment.159 Thus, institutions frequently obtain lead-plaintiff 
appointments based on complaints written by another plaintiff,160 often an 
individual who purchased common stock or who may use the formulaic 
phrase “all investors who purchased common stock” or “purchasers of the 
securities of [the issuer],”161 which excludes third party transactions like 
derivatives.162 The institutional lead plaintiff applicants are therefore 
disclosing their transactions “in the security that is the subject of the 
complaint”163 that was written by someone else. For lead plaintiff purposes, 
they calculate their financial interest in the case based on the securities 
fortuitously chosen by a plaintiff who usually will only become lead 
plaintiff if no one else is interested in the job. Alternatively, in the rarer 
instance in which institutional lead plaintiff applicants file an initial 
complaint, they may selectively plead claims over certain securities to 
maximize the appearance of their losses. 
Thus, either because of manipulation of the initial complaint by a lead 
plaintiff applicant who authored it or, more likely, because of the fortuitous 
 
159  See, e.g., Ferrari v. Gisch, 225 F.R.D. 599, 603 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (filing an original complaint on 
October 1, 2003, with four motions for appointment of lead counsel filed on December 1, 2003, two of 
which were filed by institutional investors). 
160  See, e.g., Climo v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 11-cv-80364-CIV (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2011) (granting 
Central Laborers’ Pension Fund’s motion for appointment as lead plaintiff and approving lead plaintiff’s 
selection of counsel); Mallen v. Alphatec Holding, Inc., No. 10-cv-01673-BEN (CAB), 2011 WL 
175687, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (granting the unopposed motion to appoint FCERA as lead 
plaintiff and approving selection of counsel); Wozniak v. Align Tech., Inc., No. 09-cv-03671-MMC 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1043/ALGN09_01/20091113_
f01x_09CV03671.pdf (granting the motion to appoint PPNPF as lead plaintiff, denying the motion to 
appoint Charles Wozniak as lead plaintiff, and approving lead plaintiff’s selection of counsel). 
161  See, e.g., Complaint at 1, DeAngelis v. Corzine, No. 11-cv-07866-VM (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2011), 
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1047/MF00_01/2011113_f01c_1107866.pdf (“This is a federal 
securities class action filed on behalf of all investors who purchased or otherwise acquired MF Global 
common stock between May 20, 2011 and October 28, 2011, inclusive (‘the Class Period’) for violations 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission . . . .”); Complaint at 2, Short v. Dondanville, No. 11-cv-00615-VAP (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 19, 2011), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1046/FCEN00_01/2011419_f01c_
1100615.pdf (“This is a securities class action brought by plaintiff on behalf of all persons who 
purchased or otherwise acquired 1st Centennial Bancorp . . . securities . . . .”); Complaint at 1, Richman 
v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 274 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 10-cv-03461-UA), available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/1044/GS10_01/2010426_f01c_10CV03461.pdf (“This is a securities class 
action on behalf of all persons who were damaged in connection their purchases of Goldman Sachs 
Group, Inc. . . . common stock . . . . “); Complaint at 2, Bristol Cnty. Ret. Sys. v. Wachovia Corp., No. 
08-cv-02844-SC (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2008), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1040/WB_03/
200866_f01c_082844.pdf (“This is a federal securities class action on behalf of purchasers of the 
securities of Wachovia . . . .”). 
162  Cf. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 142, at 20–21 (explaining that derivative securities are issued by 
third parties and thus do not raise capital for the issuer); ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW ON FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES 92 (2d ed. 1998) (explaining that financial derivatives are the product of real-time 
negotiation between institutional traders). 
163  § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). 
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selection of securities by the filer of the initial complaint, two problems 
arise. First, the entity that has the largest financial interest in the securities 
identified in the initial complaint will be selected lead plaintiff, rather than 
the entity that actually has the largest financial interest in the lawsuit as a 
whole. Thus, for example, whoever had the largest common stock loss will 
be selected rather than the entity that had the largest loss in both common 
and preferred stock. Second, and of greater concern, is the exclusion of 
derivatives from the initial complaint and therefore from calculation of the 
largest financial interest. Exclusion of derivatives means that a lead plaintiff 
could collect more damages than it lost in the fraud. It could even collect 
damages if it profited from the fraud. 
Consider a lead plaintiff applicant whose common stock lost $10 
million in value, but who purchased put options to hedge $9 million of its 
exposure. Upon revelation of the fraud, it exercised the put options.164 Thus, 
its net loss in the fraud is $1 million. But if all the complaint pleads are the 
common stock losses, the PSLRA only requires it to disclose the $10 
million loss in its lead plaintiff application. It could win the lead plaintiff 
appointment and collect all $10 million in damages, or $9 million more than 
it lost. (It could also claim $10 million in losses even if it were not selected 
lead plaintiff.) Meanwhile, traders who used derivatives to increase—rather 
than hedge—their exposure to the issuer would be ineligible to collect 
damages at all because derivatives were not claimed in the complaint. 
Assuming unsuccessful attempts at intervention by derivatives traders, the 
lead plaintiff could proceed with its suit as filed. The lack of transparency 
and clarity about the treatment of derivatives may fail to alert such long 
derivatives traders to the problem until they are time-barred or precluded 
from bringing separate claims, assuming such claims were substantial 
enough to bring as an independent action. 
The prospect of some investors reaping windfalls from the fraud while 
others lack a remedy raises questions about the fundamental fairness of the 
“master of the complaint” rule in this context. But it also raises issues from 
the more narrow perspective of how hidden gains (or hidden offset losses) 
may affect the lead plaintiffs’ motivation to monitor class counsel. For 
purposes of this motivation alone, does it matter whether the $10 million 
the lead plaintiff applicant can obtain in the class action is a windfall or a 
recovery? From a purely rationalist point of view, it should make no 
difference. All that matters for purposes of motivating the lead plaintiff’s 
monitoring is how much it can recover from the suit: $10 million. What it 
gained or lost in the fraud is irrelevant. A behavioralist might argue that 
whether the $10 million is viewed by the investor as a windfall or as 
 
164  Options, as well as futures and swaps, are financial instruments known as derivatives. Options 
give the buyer a right to buy (a “call” option) or sell (a “put” option) an underlying asset, usually a 
security or commodity, for a predetermined price (the “strike” price) at some point in the future. For 
more information, see COFFEE & SALE, supra note 142, at 20–25. 
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recovery may substantially affect its zeal for monitoring.165 There is 
evidence that people are more responsive to loss aversion than windfalls.166 
Derivatives pose a further complication when a complaint is later 
amended to include them. As noted above, the “relief sought by the class” 
may be expanded beyond the initial complaint to encompass nearly all 
securities, including derivatives. The most likely scenario in which this 
would occur is if the institution is forced to amend by late-arriving 
derivatives complainants.167 Such complainants may not have incurred large 
enough losses to obtain the lead plaintiff appointment but may seek to 
intervene in the case. Alternatively, they may just approach the judge or the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking inclusion. 
Returning to the above example, the hedged portion of the institutional 
investor lead plaintiff’s $10 million common stock loss will now count 
against it. The lead plaintiff who was once eligible to collect $10 million is 
now limited to collecting no more than the $1 million of its actual loss.168 
While this may be a more just result from the societal point of view, the 
lead plaintiff’s motivation to monitor class counsel has been substantially 
reduced. The plaintiffs’ lawyers who obtained the lucrative lead counsel 
position, having been selected by a lead plaintiff with large common stock 
losses, now report to a lead plaintiff with significantly diminished stakes in 
the case and far lower monitoring incentives. This was exactly the problem 
the PSLRA was designed to avoid.169 
In the absence of hard data, certain proxies reveal the scope of the 
problems posed by derivatives and lead plaintiff selection. First, the case 
cited most frequently by district courts in calculating the largest financial 
interest for lead plaintiff purposes, Lax v. First Merchants Acceptance 
 
165  See discussion infra Part IV.A (advocating that courts consider both the relative and absolute 
losses of individual applicants for co-lead-plaintiff appointments with institutions). 
166  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992) (describing loss aversion biases). 
167  See, e.g., In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 199 F.R.D. 119, 123–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(certifying shareholder class of common stock and options purchasers and sellers eighteen months after 
appointing lead plaintiffs based on common stock losses alone). 
168  See, e.g., Notice of Pendency and Certifications of Class Actions and Proposed Settlements, 
Motions for Attorneys’ Fees and Settlement Fairness Hearings at 17, In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. 
Litig., No. 04 Civ. 2115 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2006), available at http://www.
nortelsecuritieslitigation.com/notice_en2.pdf (“To the extent a Claimant had a gain from his, her or its 
overall transactions in Nortel common stock and/or Nortel put and call options during the Class Period, 
the value of the Recognized Claim will be zero. Such claimants will in any event be bound by the 
Settlement. To the extent that a Claimant suffered an overall loss on his, her or its overall transactions in 
Nortel common stock and/or options during the Class Period, but that loss was less than the Recognized 
Claim calculated above, then the Recognized Claim shall be limited to the amount of the actual loss.”). 
169  See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 8 & n.34 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 & n.34 
(quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105). 
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Corp.170—an unreported opinion subsequently cited in 106 opinions 
published on LexisNexis as of November 13, 2011 and in many more 
motions for lead plaintiff appointments—excludes derivatives from its 
calculation methodology.171 Second, practitioners report that they rarely 
include derivatives in such calculations, in part because of the complexity 
of assessing their value.172 The omission is likely a material one. Defendants 
in securities class actions are large public companies,173 and defendants in 
securities class actions led by institutional lead plaintiffs are likely to be 
among the very largest public companies, as they generate high enough 
damages to attract institutional applicants.174 Derivatives trading almost 
certainly exists in the securities of all of these defendants, and therefore, 
there are potential derivative claimants in all of these suits. It stands to 
reason that there are a substantial number of institutional lead plaintiffs who 
have hidden gains or offset losses potentially implicating their monitoring 
motivation, or who simply do not have the largest financial interest in the 
relief ultimately sought by the class. 
As to how frequently complaints are expanded to include derivatives 
after selection of the lead plaintiffs, proxies will again have to substitute for 
hard data. There are two published opinions addressing the issue,175 
 
170  No. 97 C 2715, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1997). This case is an 
unreported opinion that has subsequently been cited in 106 opinions published on LexisNexis as of 
November 13, 2011 and many more motions for lead plaintiff appointments. 
171  Id. at *17 (calculating the largest financial interest for lead plaintiff purposes based on “(1) the 
number of shares purchased; (2) the number of net shares purchased; (3) the total net funds expended by 
the plaintiffs during the class period; and (4) the approximate losses suffered by the plaintiffs”). No 
calculation of derivatives exposure is included. 
172  This is based on confidential conversations taking place on January 4, 2011, and February 14, 
2011, with veteran litigators at leading plaintiffs’ securities class action firms. These individuals had 
direct and extensive experience drafting lead plaintiff applications. 
173  See, e.g., Complaint, Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 274 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(No. 10-cv-03461-UA), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1044/GS10_01/2010426_f01c_
10CV03461.pdf; Complaint, Sklar v. Bank of Am., Corp., 258 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-
MDL-2058), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1042/BAC_01/2009121_f01c_09580.pdf; see 
also Stephen P. Ferris & A.C. Pritchard, Stock Price Reactions to Securities Fraud Class Actions Under 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 4 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 01-009, 
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=288216 (characterizing 
defendants in typical securities fraud class actions with traits unique to large public companies, such as a 
large trading volume in a secondary trading market). 
174  See James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical 
Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 373 tbl.4 (2008) (showing that 
the total assets for defendants in cases led by institutions are far higher than the total assets of defendants 
in cases led by noninstitutions). 
175  See, e.g., In re Sepracor Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 52, 54 (D. Mass. 2005) (declining to find 
that lead plaintiffs violated 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) by failing to disclose derivative trades 
because the complaint did not mention derivatives trades); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
199 F.R.D. 119, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (declining to find that lead plaintiffs violated 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(a)(2)(A)(iv) by failing to disclose derivative trades because the court had not defined the class to 
include such trades until after filing of lead plaintiff certifications). 
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although this is an issue that courts may often decide without a formal 
opinion. Growing understanding in the marketplace by derivatives traders 
that they should not assume that they are automatically class members but 
must look to how the class is defined may increase the frequency of 
expansion.176 The actual or perceived frequency of expansion of the 
complaint might affect institutional investor behavior ex ante. An institution 
that has offsetting gains through derivatives might not seek a lead plaintiff 
appointment for fear that its derivatives trading will eventually be exposed. 
On the other hand, the participants who are most aware of such risks and 
are best positioned to warn against them are the lawyers. And as noted 
above, the lawyers frequently inform the institutions of their losses via 
portfolio monitoring.177 The most cynical assessment of the lawyers’ 
incentives suggests that their best case scenario is an institutional plaintiff 
with large enough common stock losses to win the lead plaintiff 
appointment and therefore select them as lead counsel, followed by 
disclosure and amendment of the claim to include derivatives that could 
substantially increase the class’s damages while reducing the institution’s 
stake in the outcome of the case. This reduced stake in the outcome would 
reduce the institution’s incentive to monitor class counsel, undermining the 
primary purpose of the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA. A more 
benign view is that derivatives are difficult to cope with in litigation and 
that the lawyers will deal with them if raised but will not include them on 
their own. Because derivatives actually receive little scrutiny at the lead 
plaintiff stage itself, few institutions are likely to actually bother assessing 
their exposure in the first place. Such lack of attention to derivatives by 
both lawyers and institutions may also be motivated by the fact that 
derivatives trading may raise unique defenses affecting the typicality and 
adequacy of derivatives traders, which is discussed in the next Part. 
A reexamination of the statute offers limited hope for a solution. As 
noted, the PSLRA creates a rebuttable presumption that the lead plaintiff is 
whoever the court determines “has the largest financial interest in the relief 
sought by the class.”178 One might argue that a lead plaintiff applicant’s 
financial interest in the relief sought by the class may be broader than its 
holdings in the particular security or securities enumerated in the complaint. 
The unalleged ownership interest—e.g., derivatives or preferred stock in a 
case in which the operative complaint only addresses common stock—
could still constitute a financial interest in the relief sought by the class 
because the relief sought in the complaint would directly affect the 
unalleged ownership stake. Therefore, a court could examine the applicant’s 
 
176  See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Lead Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification at 9 
n.6, In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Sec., 503 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. May 18, 2006) (No. 04-1639) 
(motioning to expand the class definition to include options traders). 
177  See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text. 
178  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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entire financial interest in all securities, even when selecting a lead plaintiff 
for a case in which the operative complaint pleads only common stock. 
This reading would solve the problem. But it is in tension with the 
requirement that lead plaintiff applicants disclose their transactions “in the 
security that is the subject of the complaint.”179 Implicitly, courts read 
“relief sought” by the class as synonymous with relief “that is the subject of 
the complaint.”180 Arguably, Congress would not authorize courts to broadly 
examine a lead plaintiff applicant’s financial interest in the case but only 
require disclosure of transactions actually named in the complaint. Perhaps 
courts could simply order this disclosure on their own, reading the 
disclosure provision as a floor rather than a ceiling. 
Barring a rereading of the statute or congressional action, the legal 
uncertainty surrounding derivatives in calculating the largest financial 
interest is likely to persist. This uncertainty harms most investors, who may 
be saddled with lead plaintiffs other than those who would be most 
motivated to represent them. Individual investors are disproportionately 
impacted by the unpredictability of derivatives treatment because they are 
far less likely to engage in derivatives trading than are institutions.181 They 
have no horse in the race but are expected to pay their pro rata share of legal 
costs for it and run the risk, as class members, that their lead plaintiff or 
lead counsel might be replaced because of it. Yet their comparative lack of 
derivatives exposure makes them well-positioned to cure the problem. 
Individual investors with no derivatives exposure may be selected lead 
plaintiff with confidence that they have neither hidden gains nor hidden 
offset losses and zero risk that those losses will appear later in the litigation 
to significantly alter their monitoring incentives. The next Part further 
explores the problem of unique defenses posed by derivatives trading, and 
its disproportionate impact on individual investors. 
b. Derivatives Trading and the Challenge of Unique 
Defenses.—Even assuming that a party’s derivatives trading 
is incorporated into calculation of the largest financial interest, derivatives 
traders may face another problem. They may be subject to typicality and 
 
179  Id. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). 
180  Lax v. First Merchs. Acceptance Corp., No. 97 C 2715, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866, at *7, 
22–23 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 1997). 
181  Compare Robert Dubil, Economic Derivatives Markets—New Opportunities for Individual 
Investors: A Research Agenda, 16 FIN. SERVICES REV. 89, 91 (2007) (“Individual investors actively 
participate in cash markets for stocks and bonds. . . . Of the 25-million brokerage accounts in the U.S., 
less than 5% have any option positions, and practically none have futures.”), with RENÉ M. STULZ, 
DEMYSTIFYING FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 8 (2006), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/files/
News/7fd495c7-8fac-4fa0-939d-0200b7819d8d/Presentation/NewsAttachment/d52f2901-b85b-4dfd-
80d6-0bfc1865d6c1/Cornerstone_Research_Demystifying_Financial_Derivatives.pdf (“60 percent of 
[non-financial firms] use[] derivatives.”), and Thomas F. Siems, 10 Myths About Financial Derivatives, 
CATO INST. (Sept. 11, 1997), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-283.html (“[L]arge [multinational 
corporations and banks] are the biggest users of derivative instruments.”). 
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adequacy challenges because they are arguably subject to unique 
defenses.182 These defenses relate to two elements of a traditional securities 
fraud cause of action: (1) that the plaintiffs relied on the defendants’ false 
and misleading statements and (2) that such reliance caused their injuries.183 
Derivatives traders suing a defendant for fraud face two reliance 
arguments that a defendant could not advance against a purchaser of stock 
alone. The first is that traders who shorted the stock or otherwise hedged 
against its rise could not have relied on the purportedly false and misleading 
statements; only a purchaser or seller that assumed an increasing stock price 
could have .184 Some courts have rejected derivatives-trading lead plaintiffs 
on such grounds or required them to serve as lead plaintiffs of a separate 
class of derivatives traders.185 The second, related reliance argument faced 
by derivatives-trader plaintiffs is whether they can make use of the fraud-
on-the-market theory. The Supreme Court embraced the fraud-on-the-
market theory in the landmark case of Basic Inc. v. Levinson.186 The theory 
is based on the efficient market hypothesis, which essentially states that a 
company’s stock price reflects all publicly available information about the 
company.187 Thus, misleading statements about the company will defraud a 
purchaser of stock trading in an efficient market even if the purchaser never 
directly relied on the statements because they were reflected in the stock 
 
182  See, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 
176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[C]lass certification is inappropriate where a putative class representative is 
subject to unique defenses which threaten to become the focus of the litigation.”); see also 5 JAMES WM. 
MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.24[5] (3d ed. 2011). 
183  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
184  See, e.g., In re Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2007) 
(noting that a put option seller is not subject to unique defenses for class certification purposes because 
the seller anticipates that stock price will stagnate or rise, like a stock purchaser); In re Priceline.com 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 89, 99 (D. Conn. 2006) (allowing the appointment as lead plaintiff of a 
purchaser and holder of put options because he had testified that he assumed that the stock price would 
increase); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 150, 155 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding the typicality 
requirement of Rule 23 was met for lead plaintiff options traders “since the value of options is directly 
related to the value of common stock”); Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 371 (D. Del. 
1990) (describing how call option purchasers are similar to stock purchasers, unlike short sellers “who 
profit when the market price decreases”); Moskowitz v. Lopp, 128 F.R.D. 624, 631 (E.D. Pa. 1989) 
(noting that option traders may use the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance absent special 
circumstances). But see Zlotnick v. TIE Commc’ns, 836 F.2d 818, 823 (3d Cir. 1988) (declining 
presumption of reliance for short seller); Andrada v. Atherogenics, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 00061(RJH), 2005 
WL 912359, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2005) (declining appointment of options trader as lead plaintiff 
because of unique defenses). 
185  See, e.g., Andrada, 2005 WL 912359, at *5 (finding an options holder is subject to unique 
defenses); Weikel v. Tower Semiconducter Ltd., 183 F.R.D. 377, 391 (D.N.J. 1998) (rejecting 
certification of options purchaser as class representative); Margolis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 
1150, 1156 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (ordering subclasses of options holders and stock holders). But see In re 
Donkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that options trader met 
typicality and adequacy requirements). 
186  485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
187  See id. at 241–42 (defining fraud-on-the-market theory). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 194 
price when the purchase was made.188 The fraud-on-the-market theory 
creates a presumption that any purchaser of the security relied on the false 
and misleading statements simply by purchasing the security, since the 
stock price would have reflected and incorporated those false and 
misleading statements.189 The question of whether a derivatives trader can 
rely upon the fraud-on-the-market theory has bedeviled courts; some have 
concluded that derivatives traders may rely on the theory, others that they 
may not.190 The inquiry is fact specific.191 
Thus, appointment of an institutional class member as lead plaintiff 
carries the risk that it will not have the desired motivation to monitor class 
counsel because of hidden derivatives trading, as noted in Part II. It also 
carries the risk that the institutions will be disqualified at the class 
certification stage because of unique defenses raised by this trading. It is a 
near certainty that the issue of whether the derivatives trader is typical and 
adequate will have to be litigated, which incurs costs for the class even if 
the initial lead plaintiff derivatives trader survives the class certification 
stage as lead plaintiff. Moreover, because the courts that have ruled on the 
issue are district courts192 and because the standard of review for such a 
decision is abuse of discretion,193 there is no jurisdiction in which the issue 
 
188  See id. (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Misleading statements 
will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the 
misstatements.”)). 
189  Id. at 247 (“[W]here materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an 
impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of 
the market price may be presumed.”). 
190  Compare In re LDK Solar Sec. Litig., 255 F.R.D. 519, 532–33 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying that 
lead plaintiff’s options trading prevented him from relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory), and 
Montoya v. Herley Indus. Inc., No. 06-2596, 2006 WL 3337485, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2006) (citing 
Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 666, 676 (E.D. Pa. 
2004)) (holding that lead plaintiff that shorted stock, but was net “long” the company, could maintain a 
claim based on the fraud-on-the-market theory), and Crossen v. CV Therapeutics, No. C 03-03709, 2005 
WL 1910928, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005) (lead plaintiff seller of call options was not atypical of the 
class and could rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory), with In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. 
Supp. 2d 1102, 1109–10 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (disqualifying lead plaintiff applicant that shorted the 
company’s stock because such a plaintiff could not rely upon the fraud-on-the-market theory), and In re 
Bank One S’holders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (same). 
191  See Levinson, 485 U.S. at 239 (1988) (explaining that the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance 
is a fact-specific inquiry because “no particular event or factor short of closing the transaction need be 
either necessary or sufficient by itself”). 
192  See, e.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, 
at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (ruling on a lead plaintiff appointment). 
193  See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We review the District 
Court’s approval of a class action settlement, including its determination that the settlement was fair, 
reasonable, and adequate, for abuse of discretion.”); Zeidman v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 651 F.2d 
1030, 1038–39 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he decision to certify a class action [is] left to the sound discretion 
of the district court. Because certification of a class action has such great effect on the district court’s 
control of litigation before it, and because certification involves substantial fact questions, we will not 
reverse a district court’s decision on class certification absent an abuse of its discretion.”). 
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is truly settled, leaving it open to be litigated in every securities case led by 
an institution. 
As argued below, appointment of an individual co-lead plaintiff who 
did not engage in derivatives trading would improve the typicality and 
adequacy of the lead plaintiff. It could allow the court to conclude that the 
lead plaintiff group as a whole may rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory, 
even if the court would not have allowed a derivatives-trading institution to 
serve as a lead plaintiff alone. Or, should the court disqualify the 
derivatives trading institutional lead plaintiff on typicality and adequacy 
grounds, the continuity of the litigation may be preserved because the 
individual lead plaintiff could remain as the lead, and, perhaps more 
importantly for continuity purposes, the lead counsel selected by the 
individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs could remain in place with 
little or no disruption.194 
In sum, the fact that individual investors are much less likely to engage 
in derivatives trading than are institutional investors means that, as lead 
plaintiffs, they would expose the class to much less risk that their stake in 
the outcome will change if derivatives are included. They also offer greater 
stability to the lead plaintiff group because they will not be subject to the 
unique defenses faced by derivatives traders. 
2. Holding Versus Selling Shareholder Plaintiffs. 
a. Maximizing financial recovery.—In Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 
the district court for the Northern District of Texas appointed an 
institutional investor plaintiff with the largest loss as the lead plaintiff 
despite a competing bid from a group including at least one individual 
whose loss was substantial relative to the individual’s assets.195 The 
competing group urged that it be appointed co-lead plaintiff with the 
institution because the institution had traded in derivatives.196 The court held 
that by expressing a preference for institutional investors, Congress had 
preempted such typicality challenges based on derivatives trading.197 The 
court appointed the institution as sole lead plaintiff.198 It could have stopped 
there. But it offered an additional, revealing rationale for its holding. It 
reasoned that plaintiffs with a small absolute investment in the defendant 
company (and their lawyers) have strong incentives to seek the maximum 
 
194 Courts could retain the same lead counsel even if they choose to replace the lead plaintiff, but 
they might be more inclined to retain the original lead counsel when at least part of the original lead 
plaintiff group remains. 
195  976 F. Supp. 542, 545–46 (N.D. Tex. 1997); see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 
3C SEC & FED. CORP. L. § 16:146 (2d. ed 2004) (citing Gluck, 976 F. Supp. 542). 
196  Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 545. 
197 Id. at 548 (“By expressing a strong preference for institutional investors to be Lead Plaintiffs, 
Congress rejected typicality and adequacy objections like those of the CellStar Plaintiffs Group.”). 
198  Id. 
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damage award possible without regard to future company performance or 
share appreciation.199 Institutional investors—who the court assumed, 
probably correctly, would continue to hold shares in the defendant company 
after the fraud was revealed—would consider the long-term interests of the 
defendant and would reduce “immediate damage payments to the plaintiff 
class . . . [but] improve the chances that the company will experience future 
growth.”200 
The court’s rationale distorted the original intent of the PSLRA. 
Congress reasoned that institutional investor lead plaintiffs were better class 
representatives than professional plaintiffs who were incapable of 
monitoring plaintiffs’ lawyers.201 Congress did not say, as the Gluck court 
did,202 that the interests of investors who retained their shares in the 
defendant company were a higher priority than those of individuals who sell 
their shares because holding investors have the interests of the defendant in 
mind. Here, the Gluck court elevated the legitimate interests of institutional 
investors (long term growth of their ongoing investment in the defendant) 
over the different but equally legitimate interests of individual investors (a 
maximum damage award). In relying upon this rationale for its holding, the 
court verbalized one of the key problems this Article seeks to address: in 
consistently appointing institutional lead plaintiffs, regardless of how such 
plaintiffs’ interests conflict with those of individual investors, courts de 
facto prioritize the interests of institutional investors—and arguably, the 
interests of defendants—over those of individual investors. That was never 
Congress’s intention, and it runs afoul of Rule 23. 
In Gluck, the elevation of institutional over individual interests 
manifested itself in resolving a conflict that tends to break down along 
institutional–individual lines: the conflict between holding and selling 
shareholders of the defendant company.203 Even after a fraud is revealed, 
institutional investors often hold some stake in the defendant company.204 
 
199  Id. 
200  Id. 
201  S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 (“Institutions with 
large stakes in class actions have much the same interests as the plaintiff class generally; thus, courts 
could be more confident settlements negotiated under the supervision of institutional plaintiffs were ‘fair 
and reasonable’ than is the case with settlements negotiated by unsupervised plaintiffs’ attorneys.” 
(quoting Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2105)). 
202  For an example of reasoning similar to the Gluck court, see Naiditch v. Applied Micro Circuits 
Corp., No. 01-CV-0649-K-AJB, 2001 WL 1659115, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2001) (citing Gluck and 
appointing institutional investor as lead plaintiff despite institutional investor qualifying as a 
professional plaintiff under the PSLRA). But see In re BP, PLC Sec. Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 428, 441–42 
(S.D. Tex. 2010) (noting differences between plaintiffs and ultimately creating subclasses). 
203  Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
1487, 1505 (1996) (pursuing meritorious litigation may not be in the best interests of continuing 
shareholders). 
204  Note that in order to have standing in a securities class action, a plaintiff must have purchased or 
sold securities during the class period. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
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They do so for two primary reasons: first, because their ownership stake is 
substantial enough to further depress share prices if sold, causing even more 
harm to them; second, because compliance with portfolio diversification 
requirements hampers the funds’ ability to sell their positions even after a 
fraud.205 On the other hand, individual shareholders whose buy–sell 
decisions will have no impact on the share price frequently do sell after a 
fraud.206 This may not be a rational decision, particularly if the market has 
already priced in the harm of the fraud once it has been revealed. But it is 
not per se irrational for individual investors to sell, as it often is for 
institutions. Individual-investor stakes are not large enough to substantially 
impact the stock price when they sell; therefore, they do not further harm 
themselves through exit. 
With no ongoing interest in the defendant issuer, selling shareholders 
have a straightforward objective in the litigation: to maximize the damage 
award. The incentives for holding shareholders are more complex. Holding 
shareholders may be willing to forego some monetary compensation in 
exchange for corporate governance reforms that would make their ongoing 
investments in the company more valuable or simply to avoid damaging the 
company in which they maintain an ongoing stake.207 
The court in In re Cendant Corp. Litigation addressed this conflict, 
noting the “attractive[ness]” of plaintiffs’ arguments that the lead plaintiff 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) could not 
 
747 (1975). A lead plaintiff may hold shares in the defendant that were purchased both before and 
during the class period. Id. at 736. The pre-class period purchases would not count towards the 
plaintiff’s damages. Id. 
205  See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n institutional 
investor with enormous stakes in a company is highly unlikely to divest all of its holdings in that 
company, even after a securities class action is filed in which it is a class member.”); In re Royal 
Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 611 (D.N.J. 2005) (“[B]ecause of the very size of 
an institutional investor’s shareholdings, an institutional investor might be discouraged from divesting 
itself of the stock.”); Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the U.S. and 
the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 227 
(“Institutional investors holding equity positions in the market generally diversify their holdings . . . . 
Several factors contribute to this behavior: for example, pension funds are subject to prudence and 
portfolio diversification requirements pursuant to the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) . . . .”). 
206  BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 195, § 16:146 (“The problem, however, is that a 
substantial portion of the class are likely to have sold their stock soon after the bad news announcement 
and will not benefit from improvement of the company’s future growth.”). 
207  Cendant, 264 F.3d at 243 (noting that a lead plaintiff who retains a substantial investment faces 
a conflict between trying to get maximum recovery for the class and trying to protect its ongoing 
investment in the corporation “by settling cheap or by securing corporate governance changes in lieu of 
cash”); Alexander, supra note 203, at 1504 (arguing that current investors would prefer that sanctions be 
imposed on individuals responsible for the fraud rather than the company itself); Jill E. Fisch, Class 
Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 546 (1997) (“[A]n institution 
that continues to own stock is poorly suited to represent investors who are no longer invested in the 
company.”). 
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adequately represent the class on account of its “huge” ongoing investment 
in the defendant company because such an investment conflicted with 
maximizing recovery for the class.208 As the Cendant court noted: 
[A] rational Sell Plaintiff would be perfectly willing to push the defendant firm 
one dollar short of declaring bankruptcy, [while] a rational Hold Plaintiff 
rarely would be so willing because the increased value of her share of the 
settlement fund would almost certainly be offset by a corresponding decrease 
in the value of her stock.209  
Still, despite acknowledging the conflict, the Cendant court declined to 
disqualify CalPERS, concluding that Congress’s preference for institutional 
lead plaintiffs implied that the conflict between sell and hold plaintiffs was 
not per se disqualifying.210 But the Cendant court discussed its concerns 
about the conflict in an extended footnote in which it called the issue to the 
attention of district courts, noting that the conflict could raise class 
certification issues and strongly implying that the creation of separate 
subclasses of selling and holding plaintiffs would be an acceptable 
remedy.211 The court also noted that the conflict was mutual: selling lead 
plaintiffs might not adequately represent holding class members, just as 
holding lead plaintiffs might not adequately represent selling class 
members.212 
Despite this clarion call from the Third Circuit, other courts have done 
little about the conflict, avoiding creation of subclasses of sell and hold 
plaintiffs while declining to disqualify holding institutional investors from 
representing selling class members.213 What the Third Circuit acknowledged 
as a conflict—albeit not a disqualifying one—has been read by some courts 
as no conflict at all. For example, the court in In re Gemstar TV Guide 
International, Inc. Securities Litigation declined to acknowledge any 
conflict between selling and holding plaintiffs. The court first assumed that 
“[e]very class member shares an overriding common interest in establishing 
the existence and materiality of misrepresentations”214 (which may be true, 
but which ignores the conflict over damages for such misrepresentations) 
 
208  Cendant, 264 F.3d at 243. 
209  Id. at 244 n.25. 
210  Id. at 243–44. 
211  Id. at 244 n.25 (“[T]he use of separate classes or sub-classes is not inconsistent with the Reform 
Act because that statute deals with the identification of a lead plaintiff, and not with the proper means 
for defining a class in the first place.”). 
212  Id. 
213  Westlaw and Lexis searches on November 11, 2011 revealed no cases in which courts created 
subclasses of individual and institutional lead plaintiffs or disqualified institutional investors from 
representing sell plaintiffs because of the sell–hold conflict. I used the following search terms: “subclass 
/s(/p) “lead plaintiff” & conflict”, “subclass /s(/p) ‘sell plaintiff’ & institution!”, and “subclass! /p 
institution! /p individ! & securities”. 
214  209 F.R.D. 447, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 
F.2d 891, 910 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
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and then cited caselaw supporting the proposition that there simply was no 
such conflict in the case.215 
Cendant and Gemstar TV suggest that courts have not adopted a 
comprehensive approach to deal with the conflict between selling and 
holding plaintiffs. This is a problem which remains particularly relevant for 
individual investor members of the class, who almost exclusively suffer the 
consequences. As the Cendant court pointed out, it is true that selling lead 
plaintiffs are no more or less adequate as representatives of holding 
shareholders and vice versa.216 But the reality is that cases in which 
individuals find themselves appointed lead plaintiff are likely to be ones in 
which institutional investors have incurred losses in such trivial amounts 
(on a relative or absolute basis) that they are virtually indifferent to the 
outcome of the case; otherwise, an institution would likely have obtained 
the lead plaintiff appointment because of their larger stakes in the 
defendant, on average. The conflict usually manifests with institutional 
plaintiffs who maintain an ongoing stake in the defendant representing 
selling individual shareholders. 
In sum, the preference for institutional investor lead plaintiffs 
inherently favors hold plaintiffs over sell plaintiffs, raising Rule 23 
concerns that can be solved by appointment of an individual co-lead 
plaintiff. 
b. Corporate Governance Reform.—The corporate governance 
reform movement—a broad phrase used to describe efforts by shareholders 
to reform the rules and norms by which corporations are operated—has 
blossomed in recent years, particularly since the collapses of Enron and 
WorldCom.217 Institutional investors have led this movement; union and 
public pension funds have actively participated, striving to increase the 
voice of shareholders in corporate governance and improve supervision of 
senior management through independent board members.218 Institutional 
 
215  Id. (citing In re AST Research Sec. Litig., No. CV 94-1370 SVW, 1994 WL 722888, at *4–5 
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1994) (the Ninth Circuit has “rejected contentions that the interests of in/out traders 
can prevent certification of a class” that includes “retention plaintiffs”)); In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107 
F.R.D. 615, 621–22 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding no conflict between retention purchasers and “in-and-out” 
traders); 7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22.39, at 198 (4th ed. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff who has acquired 
and retained securities can thoroughly and adequately represent parties who purchased securities and 
then sold them, and vice versa.” (citations omitted)). 
216  Cendant, 264 F.3d at 244 n.25 (“[N]oting the possibility of a significant conflict in many 
securities class actions between the interests of individuals and institutions that purchased and then sold 
stock in the defendant firm—‘Sell Plaintiffs’—and those who bought and continue to hold such stock—
‘Hold Plaintiffs.’” (citing In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 108–10 (D.N.J. 1999))). 
217  See Sherrie R. Savett, Plaintiff’s Vision of Securities Litigation: Trends/Strategies in 2005-2007, 
in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2007, at 57, 65 (2007) (noting “improved 
corporate governance in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom debacles”). 
218  The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) is a nonprofit association of public, union, and 
corporate pension funds with combined assets that exceed $3 trillion. Its corporate governance policies 
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investors have experienced some success promoting say-on-pay initiatives, 
majority voting for election of directors, shareholder proxy access, and 
adoption of an independent board chairman.219 The recent incorporation of 
proxy access into Dodd–Frank is a legislative triumph for shareholder rights 
that is largely attributable to the efforts of these institutions (although the 
SEC’s proposed implementation of proxy access via Rule 14a-11 was 
recently struck down by the D.C. Circuit).220 Still, even if a revised form of 
proxy access ultimately passes legal scrutiny, it remains to be seen whether 
certain restrictions placed on this access will result in de facto 
inaccessibility of the proxy for shareholders.221 
All investors, including individual investors, have benefited from these 
reforms. Academic research has shown that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower 
 
are a useful example of the corporate governance objectives that institutional investors have pursued 
over the past twenty years. For example, the council maintains policies with regard to the company 
board of directors, shareholder voting rights, shareholder meetings, executive compensation, director 
compensation, and the definition of an independent director. See History, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/history (last visited Mar. 24, 2012); Corporate Governance Policies, 
COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/CII%20Corp%20Gov%20
Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%2009-29-10%20final.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
219  See Louis M. Thompson, Jr., The Individual Investor as Potential “Swing” Voter, COMPLIANCE 
WK., June 2007, at 70. 
220  Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
221  Under the Dodd–Frank Act, the SEC had authority to promulgate rules regarding shareholder 
proxy access. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules regarding proxy access). 
Pursuant to this authority, the SEC established Rule 14a-11 which allowed a shareholder group holding 
at least 3% of total voting power to access management proxies and nominate up to 25% of the board, 
gaining additional benefits and voice. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 
33-9136, 34-62764, IC-29384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,782–87 (Sept. 16, 2010). This proxy access 
regulation was then challenged by the Business Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and 
vacated by the D.C. Circuit. See Gordon Smith, Business Roundtable v. SEC, CONGLOMERATE (July 22, 
2011), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/07/business-roundtable-v-sec.html. Although the rule was 
struck down, the 3% requirement exemplifies a restriction that would put proxy access beyond the reach 
of most shareholders. See, e.g., Ted Allen, Three More Proxy Access Proposals Filed, ISS (Dec. 1, 
2011, 3:31 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.com/gov/2011/12/three-more-proxy-acess-proposals-
filed.html (“[T]he SEC’s universal access rule (Rule 14a-11) . . . would have required investor groups to 
hold a 3 percent stake for at least three years, and imposed a 25 percent cap on the board seats that could 
be contested by access nominees. That rule was overturned by a federal appeals court in July and the 
SEC appears unlikely to try to revive that rule in the coming year. While some institutional investors 
have expressed support for Rule 14a-11’s thresholds, . . . retail activists have argued that those hurdles 
would be too high and would bar small shareowners from nominating board candidates.”). 
Comparatively, investors must disclose the beneficial ownership of 5% or more of shares outstanding 
under Exchange Act Rule 13(d). 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2006). Although only 2% higher, this threshold 
was enacted to “alert the marketplace to every large, rapid aggregation or accumulation of 
securities . . . which might represent a potential shift in corporate control.” GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 
F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971); accord Amendments to Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements, 
Release No. 34-39538, 63 Fed. Reg. 2854, 2584 (Jan. 16, 1998) (noting that the 5% trigger alerts 
investors to the actions of large shareholders). 
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capital expenditures, and fewer corporate acquisitions.222 An investment 
strategy that bought firms with the strongest shareholder rights and sold 
those with the weakest rights would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5% 
per year during the sample period.223 All of the top shareholder plaintiffs’ 
law firms tout their successes in obtaining corporate governance reform on 
behalf of institutional clients.224 
Actual corporate governance activism manifests itself in two basic 
forms: nonlitigation activism and litigation activism.225 Nonlitigation 
activism includes a broad range of activities such as writing a letter to 
management or a comment letter to the SEC, participating in proxy contests 
in support of nonmanagement board nominees, withholding votes from a 
management director candidate, or lobbying state legislatures with respect 
to corporate governance.226 Litigation activism mostly includes serving as a 
lead plaintiff in a securities class action.227 While serving as a lead plaintiff 
may itself be viewed as a form of corporate governance activism, how an 
 
222  See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate 
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 813 (2009) (“Firms with a low [shareholder-friendly] E Index 
score are associated with statistically significant abnormal returns both during the 1990–1999 
period . . . and the longer 1999–2003 time period . . . .”); Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 119–21 (2003) (noting that strong 
shareholder rights are “positively correlated with size, share price, trading volume, and institutional 
ownership”). 
223  Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 222, at 109, 122. 
224  See, e.g., Corporate Governance and Reform, BARRACK, RODOS & BACINE, 
http://www.barrack.com/Corporate-Governance-and-Reform.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) 
(providing examples of the types of corporate governance reforms attained by the firm); Corporate 
Governance Reforms, BERNSTEIN LIEBHARD LLP, http://www.bernlieb.com/results/Corporate-
Governance-Reforms/index.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting firm’s “particular success using 
litigation to accomplish corporate governance improvements for shareholders”); Leadership in 
Corporate Governance Reforms, BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMANN LLP, 
http://www.blbglaw.com/our_record_results/leadership_corp_gov (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (touting 
firm as “among the first law firms to ever obtain meaningful corporate governance reforms through 
securities litigation”); Corporate Governance, KESSLER TOPAZ METZLER CHECK LLP, 
http://www.ktmc.com/investors_governance.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting the firm’s belief 
that “litigation can be used not only as a means to recover monetary losses, but also as a vehicle to 
implement corporate governance reform”); Corporate Governance, LABATON SUCHAROW, 
http://www.labaton.com/en/practiceareas/Corporate-Governance.cfm (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) 
(stating that the firm “has been leading corporate governance reform efforts for more than a decade”); 
Corporate Governance Principles, MILBERG LLP, http://www.milberg.com/rigorous-corporate-
governance-principles-institutional-investors (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (“Milberg’s work with 
institutional clients is based on the premise that good corporate governance is critical to the protection of 
shareholder assets and the sustainability of a corporation.”); Corporate Governance, ROBBINS GELLER 
RUDMAN & ROBBINS LLP, http://www.rgrdlaw.com/services-institutional-investor-corporate-
governance-reform.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) (noting firm’s corporate governance achievements). 
225  Choi & Fisch, supra note 48, at 326–32 (describing corporate governance activism). 
226  Id. at 326–29. 
227  Id. at 330–31. 
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institution performs in that role is a function of how much it prioritizes 
corporate governance reform. 
A securities fraud class action offers the shareholder class, and in 
particular the lead plaintiff, a unique opportunity to demand corporate 
governance reform from the issuer defendant.228 With the corporation 
reeling from a publicly disclosed fraud, sharp investor losses, negative press 
coverage, and a breakdown in the corporation’s self-policing mechanisms 
designed to root out the fraud in the first place, it is often eager to make at 
least cosmetic and hopefully substantive reforms designed to restore 
investor confidence and prevent renewed abuses.229 Institutional investors 
have successfully utilized their positions as lead plaintiffs to obtain such 
reforms. For example, in their capacity as lead plaintiffs in the 
UnitedHealth Group shareholder litigation—the largest ever stock options 
backdating case—CalPERS and the Alaska Plumbing and Pipefitting 
Industry Pension Trust obtained a $925 million recovery (minus costs) and 
substantial corporate governance reforms.230 These reforms included “a 
process for election of a shareowner-nominated director, enhanced 
standards for director independence, a mandated holding period for option 
shares acquired by executives, shareowner approval of any stock option re-
pricing, and that incentive compensation take into consideration 
UnitedHealth’s performance as compared to its peer group.”231 Current and 
future shareholders likely benefited from such reforms, but selling 
shareholders did not. Unless one assumes that UnitedHealth agreed to these 
corporate governance reforms in exchange for nothing, it follows that the 
reforms were obtained in exchange for a reduction in compensation for the 
shareholder class.232 
 
228  See, e.g., Todd Henderson, Governance at Gunpoint, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Sept. 12, 
2006, 11:26 AM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/09/governance_at_g.html (noting the 
merits of governance reform through litigation and deliberation). 
229  See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 247 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating defendant issuer 
may have agreed to corporate governance changes “as a way to show investors that it was addressing the 
situation that allowed the fraud to occur in the first place, thus trying to make itself more attractive”). 
230  See Notice of Pendency and Settlement of Class Action, Exhibit A1 at 15–16, In re 
UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., No. 0:06-CV-01691-JMR-FLN (D. Minn. Dec. 22, 2008); 
UnitedHealth Group Agrees to Resolve Federal Securities Class Action Lawsuit, UNITEDHEALTH GRP. 
(July 2, 2008), http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/newsroom/news.aspx?id=92f1c380-fcfc-4228-85bf-
9b6ffdd11921. 
231  Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS, UnitedHealth Group Reach $895 Million Settlement in 
Class-Action Case—Includes Landmark Corporate Governance Reforms (July 2, 2008), available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-archive/pr-2008/jul/unitedhealth-reach-
settlement.xml. 
232  Cf. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 219, 246–47 (noting objector’s grievance that the lead plaintiff 
negotiated a settlement including corporate governance changes that would only benefit class members 
that continued to hold Cendant stock after revelation of the fraud, and ultimately rejecting the objection 
because the objector failed to present evidence that corporate governance reform was exchanged for 
reduced compensation). 
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In addition to raising concerns about the compensation of sell 
plaintiffs, the tradeoff between compensation and corporate governance 
reform raises concerns about another threshold purpose of securities class 
actions: deterrence of fraud.233 In theory, the purpose of securities class 
actions is not only to compensate investors for their losses, but to punish the 
perpetrators of the fraud in the hopes that such punishment will deter other 
actors from engaging in it.234 Deterrence is attained when the individual 
perpetrators of the fraud and the corporation itself are forced to pay a price 
that leaves the perpetrators worse off financially than they were prior to the 
fraud.235 Such deterrence discourages individuals from committing fraud 
and incentivizes the corporate defendant to institute methods and 
procedures for preventing the fraud in the first place.236 
While corporate governance reform is admirable to the extent it 
improves company value and helps prevent and detect future frauds, when it 
is being exchanged for lower damages payments it may not only be unfair 
to sell plaintiffs but may raise concerns about underdeterrence. First, 
corporate governance reform that halts ongoing fraud and enhances the 
detection of future fraud only ensures that defendants must stop the scheme. 
Securities litigation is supposed to be a deterrent, not an amnesty 
program.237 Second, not all corporate governance reforms arising from 
securities litigation directly target the fraud itself.238 Some enhance 
shareholder value in other ways. For example, increasing oversight by the 
audit committee might directly enhance fraud detection and deterrence, but 
shifting from staggered to annually elected boards of directors would seem 
to have at most a tenuous connection to fraud and thus little deterrent effect. 
Moreover, while holding shareholders, even individual holding 
shareholders, may benefit from corporate governance improvements, 
institutional shareholders disproportionately benefit from such 
improvements. For example, as noted in the UnitedHealth litigation 
mentioned above, it is not uncommon for lead plaintiff institutions to seek 
 
233  John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1545–48 (2006) (discussing compensatory and deterrence 
rationales). 
234  See id. at 1547 (“But if the securities class action fails as a mechanism for compensation, it can 
still perform admirably as a form of deterrence.”). 
235  See id. at 1548 (“In principle, if insiders face an expected penalty that exceeds their expected 
gain, this should be sufficient to remove any incentive for them to inflate the corporation’s stock 
price.”). 
236  In practice, optimal deterrence is rarely obtained in securities class actions. In particular, the 
deterrence function is often inhibited because settlements are often paid by directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurers and not by the perpetrators personally. See, e.g., id. at 1567–70 (discussing the way in 
which officer insurance and indemnification negatively affect the deterrence function). 
237  See id. at 1547. 
238  See Press Release, CalPERS, supra note 231 (including “incentive compensation [that] take[s] 
into consideration UnitedHealth’s performance” among the listed corporate governance reforms). 
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the establishment of a shareowner nominating committee for director 
elections.239 Typically such committees are comprised of shareholders who 
own some minimal threshold of the company’s stock, usually enough to 
ensure that they will be institutional investors.240 Such investors may find 
themselves appointed to the committee. While all investors likely benefit 
from an increased shareholder voice within the corporate management 
structure, the institutions that actually obtain a seat on such committees 
disproportionately benefit and therefore may be inclined to trade monetary 
compensation in exchange for such reform. As argued below, appointment 
of an individual seller as co-lead plaintiff would embed a voice for 
maximizing recovery within the lead plaintiff structure and push the balance 
of protected interests back towards the underrepresented individual sell 
plaintiffs. 
3. Mergers and Acquisitions: Institutional Investors with Equity in 
Both the Target and the Bidder.—In state-level transactional class 
actions, the bulk of which historically took place in Delaware,241 the 
plaintiff shareholder class generally brings an action alleging that the 
company’s board failed to obtain a sufficient price for the company’s shares 
in a friendly merger or other fundamental corporate transaction, or failed to 
respond adequately to a hostile bid.242 Such cases may also allege that a 
controlling shareholder violated its fiduciary duties to minority shareholders 
by “cash[ing] out the minority at an unfair price, or through unfair 
dealings.”243 They may allege self-dealing by management either in 
management buyouts or sales to a friendly third party.244 Class actions may 
also arise in hostile bidder or second bidder situations (when a second 
 
239  See id. 
240  See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate rules regarding proxy access); 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Release Nos. 33-9136, 34-62764, IC-29384, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 56,668, 56,782–87 (Sept. 16, 2010) (allowing a shareholder group holding at least 3% of total 
voting power to access management proxies and nominate up to 25% of the board, gaining additional 
benefits and voice). 
241  See e.g., John Armour, Bernard S. Black and Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act 1 (Nw. 
Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-04, July 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1677400 (stating shareholder lawsuits against Delaware corporations have historically been 
filed in Delaware). But see John Armour, Bernard S. Black and Brian R. Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing 
Its Cases? 5 (Nw. Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-03, Mar. 25, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404 (noting the recent trend away from corporate law litigation in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery). 
242  Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: 
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 173–75 (2004) (analyzing acquisition cases 
including friendly, hostile, arm’s length, and control-shareholder transactions). 
243  Id. at 173–74 (finding it especially likely when the controlling shareholder owns more than 50% 
of the company). 
244  Id. at 174 (“The MBO cases raise conflict-of-interest claims because of the potential for the 
target company’s board of directors to give its managers special preferences in a sale of control.”). 
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bidder emerges after management has announced a friendly acquisition 
deal).245 
The process of selecting transactional lead plaintiffs in Delaware is 
similar, but not identical, to the federal process under the PSLRA. Delaware 
judges assess: (1) “the ‘quality of the pleading’ that appears best able to 
represent the interests of the shareholder class and derivative plaintiffs;” (2) 
“the relative economic stakes of the competing litigants in the outcome of 
the lawsuit (to be accorded ‘great weight’);” (3) “the willingness and ability 
of all the contestants to litigate vigorously on behalf of an entire class of 
shareholders;” (4) “the absence of any conflict between larger, often 
institutional, stockholders and smaller stockholders;” (5) “the enthusiasm 
or vigor with which the various contestants have prosecuted the lawsuit;” 
and (6) “competence of counsel and their access to the resources necessary 
to prosecute the claims at issue.”246 TCW Technology Ltd. Partnership v. 
Intermedia Communications, Inc. established this standard for selecting 
lead plaintiffs, formulating the economic stakes test as one that evaluated 
the “greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.”247 In so doing, 
the TCW Technology court noted that this test “give[s] recognition to large 
shareholders or significant institutional investors who are willing to litigate 
vigorously on behalf of an entire class of shareholders, provided no 
economic or other conflicts exist between the institutional shareholder and 
smaller, more typical shareholders.”248 Approximately 40% of all 
transactional class actions that have been filed in Delaware since TCW 
Technology have been led by institutional investors.249 
State-level transactional class actions present yet another forum for the 
tensions between institutional and individual investors. Institutional 
investors hold billions of dollars in diversified assets. Consequently, they 
will often own shares in both the bidder and target companies.250 This 
presents potential conflicts, particularly in the context of a change-in-
control transaction in which the target board is obligated to maximize the 
price for target shareholders.251 As a lead plaintiff, an institutional investor 
 
245  Id. (noting that hostile-bidder situations make up only about 10% of acquisition litigation). 
246  Wiehl v. Eon Labs, No. Civ.A. 1116-N, 2005 WL 696764, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2005) 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
247  TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000). 
248  Id. (establishing standard for selection of lead plaintiffs favoring institutional investors similar to 
PSLRA) (emphasis added). 
249  Webber, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
250  Miguel A. Ferreira, Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos, Shareholders at the Gate? Institutional 
Investors and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 601, 638 (2010) (stating that 
some institutional investors hold both target and bidder shares). 
251  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) 
(beginning a line of cases enforcing a duty to get the best price for the shareholders once the company is 
up for sale). 
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should typify the class of target shareholders and zealously advocate on 
their behalf.252 The institution must strive to maximize the price paid for the 
class’s shares by the acquirer, augment disclosures, and create an open 
bidding process in the hope that the class will benefit from a bidding war.253 
But as shareholders in the acquiring company, institutional investors’ 
interests may run counter to these objectives. The dollars they win as 
members of the target class are dollars they lose as an acquirer shareholder, 
and vice versa. If the institutional investors’ stake in the acquirer is greater 
than their stake in the target, their net financial incentive is to lower the 
bidding price, not increase it. Moreover, where more than one bidder or 
potential bidder exists for the target, an institutional lead plaintiff with 
ownership stakes in these bidders or potential bidders might seek remedies 
that either expand or restrict the bidding process. The institution might take 
into account its ownership stake in the bidders rather than focusing solely 
on its ownership stake in the target. 
This conflict has been raised in the Delaware Chancery Court. For 
example, in a recently filed brief in Police & Fire Retirement System of the 
City of Detroit v. Yahoo! Inc., a competing lead plaintiff challenged the 
Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit’s (Detroit P&F) 
application for appointment as lead plaintiff in a shareholder class action 
brought against Yahoo!’s board.254 Yahoo!’s shareholders claimed that the 
board breached its fiduciary duties by rejecting Microsoft’s offer to pay a 
62% premium for Yahoo!’s shares.255 The Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 
Union No. 630 Pension–Annuity Trust Fund (P&P) argued that Detroit 
P&F should be disqualified as the lead plaintiff representing Yahoo!’s 
shareholders because it also owned shares in Microsoft.256 In defense of its 
application, Detroit P&F responded that the court had never held “that a 
proposed representative plaintiff is subject to disqualification due to an 
equity interest in a potential acquirer.”257 It further argued that adopting 
such a rule would “exclude every multi-billion dollar investment fund from 
 
252  DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(a)(3)–(4), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/
download.aspx?=39138. 
253  See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185 (creating a duty for the board to get the best possible price for the 
shareholders once the company is up for sale); see also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 
1110, 1120–21 (Del. 1994) (regarding duties of a controlling shareholder); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., 
Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (reinforcing the Revlon duty via auction). 
254  Memorandum of Law in Further Support of the Detroit Funds’ Motion for Consolidation, 
Appointment of Lead Counsel and in Opposition to the Plumbers & Pipefitters Competing Motion at 1, 
Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3561, 2008 WL 2213692, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3, 
2008) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law]. 
255  See Aaron ex rel. Yahoo! Inc. v. Yang, No. C-08-05438 RMW, 2009 WL 1689707, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. June 15, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Congregation Beth Aaron ex rel. Yahoo! Inc. v. Yang, 400 Fed. 
App’x 252 (9th Cir. 2010). 
256  Memorandum of Law, supra note 254, at 1. 
257  Id. at 1. 
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participating” in litigation in Delaware cases involving two or more public 
companies.258 The court appointed Detroit P&F lead plaintiff without 
commenting on the conflict.259 There is nothing in the record indicating that 
the court required disclosure of Detroit P&F’s stake in Microsoft. Without 
such disclosure, it is difficult to discern how one could assess whether there 
was “any conflict between larger, often institutional, stockholders and 
smaller stockholders.”260 
As Detroit P&F pointed out, because of broad shareholdings by 
institutional investors, a per se rule barring investors that maintain an equity 
position in a bidder would de facto disqualify institutions from serving as 
lead plaintiffs.261 But intermediate positions exist between barring such 
investors from serving as lead plaintiffs and ignoring the conflicts they 
present. For example, one seemingly straightforward solution might be to 
require institutional investors to disclose their stakes in actual bidders—
e.g., Detroit P&F disclosing its shares in Microsoft. From this, a simple 
calculation would follow (subject to the complexities of calculating 
derivatives exposure). What is the lead plaintiff applicant’s financial 
interest in the bidder relative to the target? An institution whose financial 
interest in the bidder exceeds its interest in the target should simply be 
barred from serving as the lead plaintiff because its financial interests 
directly conflict with those of the class. One would hope that an 
institutional lead plaintiff that finds itself in this situation would not seek a 
lead plaintiff appointment that would be against its own interests and 
thereby create a conflict between the fund’s duties to its beneficiaries and 
its duties to the shareholder class as lead plaintiff. 
It is worth pausing here to investigate why a fund might ever seek a 
lead plaintiff appointment to represent a class of shareholders with whom 
the fund’s interests are in direct conflict. The reasons range from the sinister 
to the merely negligent. One reason could be that the board members of the 
fund retain some private benefit from bringing the litigation even if the suit 
runs counter to the fund’s interests. For example, politicians serving on a 
fund’s board might win favorable publicity by using the fund’s lead 
plaintiff status to win concessions from the bidder in favor of the target, 
particularly if the target is located within the politician’s constituency and 
employs voters. Politicians might also bring an action if they have received 
a campaign contribution from the plaintiffs’ lawyers interested in bringing 
the case, although recent empirical work suggests these concerns are 
 
258  Id. at 1–2. 
259  See Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of Detroit v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 3561 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2008), 
available at http://www.blbglaw.com/cases/00071_data/Yahoo-SignedOrderofCons.03-05-08.pdf 
(consolidating three cases and appointing Detroit P&F as lead plaintiff). 
260  Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., No. Civ.A. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 
3, 2002). 
261  Memorandum of Law, supra note 254, at 1. 
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overblown.262 On the more sinister end of the spectrum—in what is an 
admittedly improbable but still possible scenario—an institutional investor 
could obtain lead plaintiff status for the purpose of thwarting the litigation. 
This would be a blatant violation of the fund’s fiduciary duty to the class of 
shareholders it is supposed to represent. Nevertheless, with no required 
disclosure of the fund’s holdings in the bidder, the risk of exposure would 
seem low, and if the stakes were high enough for the institutional investor, 
it might conclude on a cost–benefit basis that obtaining the lead plaintiff 
appointment would be worth the risk. Investors have exhibited similarly 
mercenary behavior in the realm of empty voting, in which investors with 
no financial interest in a bidder, but with a voting interest, campaign for the 
bidder to pay maximum price for the target company in which the 
investor’s true financial interest actually lies.263 In the empty-voting 
scenario, the investor voting in favor of the high price deceptively appears 
to have the same interests as its fellow investors, when in fact their interests 
are opposed.264 In the empty-voting scenario, though, the investor owes no 
duty to its fellow investors,265 whereas a fund that obtained a lead plaintiff 
appointment would owe a fiduciary duty to fellow investors as class 
representative.266 The mere existence of the duty would presumably make 
the lead plaintiff scenario less likely than the empty-voting scenario, but 
many cases settle with no change in the offer price and a handful of 
relatively meaningless disclosures of little material interest to shareholders. 
The mere presence of an unattractive settlement for the target’s 
shareholders is unlikely to raise suspicions about a lead plaintiff willfully 
underlitigating a case. 
Another more benign but nevertheless troubling reason why a fund 
would seek to represent a class of target shareholders when its ownership 
stake in the bidder or bidders exceeds its stake in the target is simple 
negligence. The fund may not examine its ownership stake in the bidder or 
bidders because it does not have to. There have been prior examples of such 
 
262  Webber, supra note 96, at 2080 (“[P]oliticians and political control negatively correlate with 
lead plaintiff appointments in securities class actions.”). 
263  See Hu & Black, supra note 13, at 830 (“Empty voting on the acquirer’s side by the target’s 
shareholders, employed if the vote is likely to be close, could reduce whatever constraint the vote 
requirement now instills on the acquiring firm.”); Shaun P. Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered 
Shares 34 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 
05-23, Oct. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=621323 (“[M]illions of target shares . . . come to 
be owned by encumbered shareholders with a single incentive: to ensure that the deal is approved, 
regardless of its merits.”). 
264  See Hu & Black, supra note 13, at 894 (suggesting that such empty voting would constitute the 
same breach of fiduciary duties as classic vote buying). 
265  Id. at 893–95 (finding no duty between investors). 
266  7 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22:5, at 37 (4th ed. 2002) (“The lead plaintiff owes a 
fiduciary duty to all members of the proposed class to provide fair and adequate representation and 
actively to work with class counsel to obtain the largest recovery for the proposed class consistent with 
good faith and meritorious advocacy.”). 
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negligence on the part of funds.267 As in the “thwarting” example above, 
such negligence might also constitute a breach of fiduciary duty to the class, 
or to the institution’s own shareholders or beneficiaries. 
Even in the most typical scenario, where an institution whose interest 
in the target exceeds its interest in the bidder and thus benefits from 
increasing the share price, the institution’s incentives are neither as strong 
nor as pure as a shareholder invested only in the target. The institution will 
still be protective of its ongoing investment in the bidder. Here, an 
institutional lead plaintiff bears a closer resemblance to the institutional 
“holding” lead plaintiff in a PSLRA suit, presenting similar conflicts of 
interest that can hamper the interests of the entire class. 
A simple procedure to remedy these conflicts follows from this basic 
example. The court should calculate a lead plaintiff’s actual financial 
interest by subtracting its holdings in the bidder from its holdings in the 
target. Thus, if institution A maintains a $10 million investment in the target 
and a $5 million investment in the bidder, its financial interest is $5 million. 
If institution B invests $7 million in the target and $1 million in the bidder, 
its financial interest is $6 million. If institution C invests $12 million in the 
target and $15 million in the bidder, its financial interest is -$3 million. 
Under current Delaware practice, the preferred lead plaintiff would be 
institution C.268 Under the proposal here, institution B should be selected.269 
While this procedure is straightforward in the situation of a target with 
one bidder (again, subject to the complexities of derivatives exposure), it 
becomes more complex when multiple bidders are involved. In that case, 
the institutional lead plaintiffs’ interests may vary substantially depending 
on the bidder: Institution A may have a $5 million stake in one bidder and a 
$1 million stake in another. A further degree of complexity is added if one 
includes potential bidders—bidders who have expressed some interest but 
have not made a bid or may otherwise be obvious bidders for the target. 
 
267  See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 85, at 412 (finding that large financial institutions 
frequently do not make claims on money owed from class action litigation). 
268  See TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (“[T]he Court should give weight to the shareholder plaintiff that has the 
greatest economic stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.”). 
269  Institution B might also offer more benefit to the class than an institution with the same financial 
interest—$6 million—but no investment in the bidder. For example, one of the chief complaints in state-
level transactional litigation is that the target board has exchanged its approval and recommendation of 
the merger for seats on the board of the bidder or the post-merger entity. See, e.g., In re Atlas Energy 
Res., LLC, Unitholder Litig., No. 4589-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 216, at *46–47 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 
2010) (attacking the independence of a target company’s board members on the grounds that they were 
promised seats on the board of the surviving company); Krim v. ProNet, Inc., 744 A.2d 523, 525 (Del. 
Ch. 1999) (asserting that the target board breached its duty of loyalty in approving a merger because 
several directors would receive seats on the acquirer board if the merger were finalized). A significant 
shareholder in the bidder would have some leverage to maximize price or open up the process to other 
bidders or at least put pressure on the bidder to disclose its financial arrangements with target directors 
or officers. 
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Without analyzing every possible permutation, it is clear that there is a 
point of diminishing returns to this inquiry when its complexity and 
inconvenience could outweigh its benefits in producing a conflict-free lead 
plaintiff. In such circumstances, the court should use its discretion to 
fashion a solution that is suitable to the particular case, whether that be a 
group of lead plaintiffs or the selection of the lead plaintiff with the largest 
net financial interest at the time of application, regardless of what bidders 
may subsequently step forward. Still, the potential complexity of such an 
inquiry should not lead courts to avoid it altogether. In many instances the 
inquiry will not be complex at all. 
As is discussed below, appointment of an individual co-lead plaintiff 
who is invested only in the target would significantly improve the typicality 
and adequacy of the lead plaintiff group. 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL AND 
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS 
The conflicts outlined above place federal district court judges in a 
bind, caught between two competing congressional commands: (1) to 
appoint an institutional investor lead plaintiff and (2) to abide by Rule 23.270 
This Article argues that, in practice, courts have followed the first command 
at the expense of the second. The best way for federal district judges to 
harmonize both commands is to appoint a qualified individual investor as 
co-lead plaintiff with an institutional investor. Judges should only opt for 
subclasses on motion from one of the co-lead plaintiffs in the unlikely event 
that the co-leads simply cannot agree about what is in the best interests of 
the class they represent. This same solution applies to Delaware Chancery 
Court judges and indeed any state court system which articulates a 
preference for institutional investor lead plaintiffs. Such judges are 
similarly caught between this preference and state versions of Rule 23. 
A. Appointment of an Individual Co-lead Plaintiff with an Institutional 
Lead Plaintiff 
The PSLRA grants courts the authority to appoint as lead plaintiff a 
“person or group of persons.”271 Such authority has been used to appoint 
small lead plaintiff groups that jointly apply for the job.272 It has also been 
 
270  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2006) (creating the “most adequate plaintiff” 
rule that favors institutional investors); H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 (noting that Congress “intend[ed] that the lead plaintiff provision will 
encourage institutional investors to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits”). 
271  § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I); see also In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 49 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that the PSLRA “expressly contemplates the appointment of more than one 
plaintiff”). 
272  See, e.g., Johnson v. Pozen Inc., No. 1:07CV599, 2008 WL 474334, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 15, 
2008) (appointing an individual and a fund as co-lead plaintiffs to provide diversity in representation). 
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used to join separate applicants as co-lead plaintiffs.273 Delaware courts 
have similarly appointed lead plaintiff groups consisting of both co-
applicants and competing applicants.274 I have found some instances in 
which courts have appointed individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs 
with the explicit goal of combining the representative qualities of each to 
craft one typical and adequate lead plaintiff group. In Johnson v. Pozen Inc., 
the court stated that “proposed Co-Lead Plaintiffs have argued persuasively 
that an institution/individual Co-Lead Plaintiff structure will provide a 
diversity of representation and also protect the interests of the class at class 
certification in the event that either [the individual] or the Pension Fund 
later leaves the action for whatever reason.”275 In Plumbers & Pipefitters 
Local 51 Pension Fund v. First Bancorp., the court similarly appointed 
individual and institutional co-lead plaintiffs, noting: 
[W]hile the Pension Fund has the expertise to prosecute the litigation in the 
manner contemplated by the PSLRA . . . the small size of its loss may diminish 
its incentive to carry out that function vigorously. Also, there are special 
defenses that may be raised against the Pension Fund different from those that 
may be raised against [the individual co-lead plaintiff appointees].276  
It is noteworthy that in both Johnson and Plumbers & Pipefitters, the lead-
plaintiff applicants with the largest financial interest in the relief sought by 
the class happened to be individual investors, so the courts appointed 
institutional co-lead plaintiffs.277 Still, the rationales discussed, particularly 
 
273  Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. LaBranche & Co., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 
395, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Other courts have determined that the interests of a proposed class will be 
served best by the appointment of co-lead plaintiffs or multiple lead plaintiffs who did not move initially 
as a group.”); Miller v. Ventro Corp., No. 01-CV-1287, 2001 WL 34497752, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
28, 2001) (appointing separate movants as co-lead plaintiffs in order to ensure adequate representation). 
274  See, e.g., Nierenberg v. CKx Inc., No. 5545–CC, 2011 WL 2185614, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. May 27, 
2011) (appointing a co-applicant group as lead plaintiff); In re Allion Healthcare Inc. S’holders Litig., 
No. 5022–CC, 2011 WL 1135016, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 2011) (noting appointment of competing 
applicants as co-lead plaintiffs). 
275  2008 WL 474334, at *3; see also In re Cable & Wireless, PLC, Sec. Litig., 217 F.R.D. 372, 
375–77 (E.D. Va. 2003) (exercising discretion to appoint institution co-lead plaintiff with individual 
investor because individual had purchased defendant issuer’s American Depositary Receipts on NYSE, 
whereas institution could represent purchasers of defendant issuer’s common stock on London Stock 
Exchange); Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-0166, 2002 WL 638571, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 
Apr. 17, 2002) (observing that the inclusion of an institutional investor with two individual investors 
helps to “improve[] diversity of experience” for the class); Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v. 
Campbell Soup Co., No. Civ.A. 00-152 (JEI), 2000 WL 486956, at *3 (D.N.J. 2000) (“The Court also 
considers it desirable to have both an institutional investor, like Connecticut, and individual investors, 
like DeValle and Green, included as lead plaintiffs since each may bring a unique perspective to the 
litigation.”); Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“The 
Court also finds that with the appointment of one lead plaintiff who is an individual private investor and 
one lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, the lead plaintiffs will represent a broader range of 
shareholder interests than if the Court appointed an individual or an institutional investor alone.”). 
276  409 F. Supp. 2d 482, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
277  Id.; Johnson, 2008 WL 474334, at *3. 
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in Plumbers & Pipefitters, fit the reverse scenario as well, with an 
institution that has the largest absolute loss but one that is trivial relative to 
its asset size, though it seems no court has chosen to apply this reasoning in 
such a circumstance. 
The procedure for selecting the individual co-lead plaintiff should 
mimic that for selecting lead plaintiffs generally. A court should conduct 
the lead plaintiff contest, where applicable, on two tracks. The first track 
would be for the selection of the institutional lead plaintiff, the second for 
selection of the individual. This sequence should be observed in order to 
select an individual co-lead plaintiff who complements the institutional lead 
plaintiff, not the other way around. The sequence maintains fidelity to 
Congress’s preference for the selection of institutional investor lead 
plaintiffs. 
As to the procedure for the individual lead plaintiff selection, the court 
should first establish which applicants have the largest absolute financial 
interest in the relief sought by the class. The most straightforward way to 
analyze this would be to determine which applicant incurred the largest loss 
in the fraud after disclosure of all relevant securities. This procedure alone 
would ensure an individual co-lead plaintiff with a significant stake in the 
case. And it is likely that this stake relative to the individual’s net worth or 
total portfolio is greater than that of the institution’s loss relative to its total 
portfolio.278 Courts wishing to delve deeper should then consider the losses 
of the leading individual candidates relative either to their total assets or 
their total investment portfolios. The selection process need not be overly 
formalistic or rigid. The court could identify the individuals with the largest 
absolute losses (compared to other individuals) and look to the size of these 
losses relative to the individuals’ overall portfolio or net worth.279 The 
purpose of this inquiry would be to enable the court to refine its choice 
among competing individual lead plaintiff applicants by determining which 
of these individuals with the most substantial absolute losses have incurred 
losses that are sufficiently material to motivate them to monitor class 
counsel. Individuals with high relative losses can be counted on to serve as 
motivated lead plaintiffs who will push their lawyers and the defendants to 
maximize monetary recovery for the class280 and may well be sophisticated 
enough for the job, as discussed in the survey of the financial literature 
 
278 See e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6027-VCL, 2010 WL 5550677, at 
*6–7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) (selected as lead plaintiff a pension trust that owned 25,000 shares worth 
$475,000 and representing 0.07% of its assets under management instead of a European asset manager 
for private and institutional clients that held 1,899,900 shares worth $36 million and representing 0.02% 
of its assets under management.) 
279 Individuals who may be sensitive to disclosing their net worth or the size of their portfolios may 
request confidential treatment of this information. 
280  See generally Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1053, 1067–72 (G.M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) 
(noting the effect narrow framing has on individual preference and evaluation of utility). 
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above.281 Courts could measure the applicants’ sophistication by requiring 
them to submit affidavits offering some brief biographical background, 
similar to what institutional investors and their lawyers currently present,282 
along with their certifications attesting to the purchases. In most cases, the 
individual investor should not have traded in derivatives of the stock, 
should be a sell plaintiff and not a hold plaintiff, and therefore, should be 
very interested in maximizing the damage payment to shareholders. At the 
state transactional level, the individual should not hold stock in the bidder. 
These restrictions should rule out few individuals, as they are attributes 
more commonly associated with institutional investors. 
Once the individual and institution are selected, the court should then 
determine whether the combined lead plaintiffs comply with the Rule 23 
requirements that they be typical and adequate class representatives. If the 
court finds that the co-lead plaintiffs fail the test, it can drop any of the co-
lead plaintiffs, or all of them, and begin the process again. As with the 
current PSLRA procedure, once the presumptive co-lead plaintiffs are 
established, other members of the plaintiff class may overcome the 
presumption by demonstrating that the co-lead plaintiffs “will not fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class; or . . . [are] subject to unique 
defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the 
class.”283 The objective is for the individual investor, in looking out for her 
own best interests, to be looking out for those of the individual investor 
class members as well. The institutional and individual investors would 
jointly select lead counsel or select their respective counsel as co-lead 
counsel. 
This procedure should ensure a more robust airing of the views of all 
class members in lead plaintiff decisions made on their behalf. Selecting the 
right individual co-lead plaintiff would improve the motivation and possibly 
the sophistication of the lead plaintiff group. The right individual co-lead 
plaintiff would reduce concerns about whether the lead plaintiff group is 
typical and adequate.284 For derivatives trading, an individual co-lead 
plaintiff would reduce concerns about hidden gains or hidden offset losses 
in the lead plaintiff group. An individual who did not trade in derivatives 
 
281  See discussion supra Part II. 
282  See, e.g., In re Bank of America Corp. Sec., Derivative & Emp’t Ret. Income Sec. Act (ERISA) 
Litig., 258 F.R.D. 260, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (referencing the high level of experience possessed by 
proposed lead counsel); Se. Penn. Transp. Auth. v. Rubin, No. 6323-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 67, at 
*4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2011) (explaining that where all lead counsel applicants “have successfully served 
as lead or co-lead counsel in varying numbers of complex cases,” the applicants cannot be distinguished 
and selected based on that prior experience); see also In re Molson Coors Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 233 
F.R.D. 147, 151 (D. Del. 2005) (noting that lead plaintiff applicant explained its qualifications by stating 
that “[it] has been appointed lead plaintiff or co-lead plaintiff in four securities class actions, and has 
never been rejected on adequacy grounds” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
283  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II) (2006). 
284  See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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could insulate an otherwise attractive lead plaintiff group from attacks on its 
institutional members who might have reliance problems. Even if such 
attacks are successful in disqualifying the institutional lead plaintiff, the 
presence of the individual lead assures continuity of representation for the 
class both in terms of the individual lead plaintiff and the lead counsel. 
Conversely, to the extent that courts find that the presence of an individual, 
non-derivatives-trading investor “cures” the typicality and adequacy issue 
for a co-lead plaintiff group that includes a derivatives trader, this might 
attract the participation of large institutional investors that might otherwise 
not apply to be a lead plaintiff or might otherwise opt out and bring a 
separate action because of the potential conflicts caused by its derivatives 
trading. Such investors are the type Congress had in mind in adopting the 
lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA in the first place.285 
Regarding conflicts over compensation versus corporate governance 
reform between holding and selling plaintiffs, the individual co-lead 
plaintiff could restore the voice of selling plaintiffs into the settlement 
process. Such a voice might not only improve monetary compensation for 
the class but could also aid in preserving the deterrence function of the class 
action. Likewise, an individual co-lead plaintiff would ensure that a 
member of the lead-plaintiff group in a state-level transactional class action 
has an equity stake in the target alone and not the bidder. While conflicts 
created by an institutional owner of both the target and the bidder(s) could 
be alleviated through disclosure of the applicants’ holdings in the bidder as 
outlined in Part III.B.3 above, appointment of an unconflicted individual 
co-lead creates added assurance that the interests of the lead plaintiff group 
are properly aligned with the class, particularly when the presence of 
multiple bidders greatly complicates the relative-stakes analysis for 
institutional investors. And unlike the use of subclasses, an individual–
institutional co-lead plaintiff allows individual class members to benefit 
from the sophistication and experience of the institutional lead plaintiffs 
without subordinating their interests to them or exposing both subclasses to 
divide-and-conquer strategies by defendants, as discussed below. In 
addition, this procedure facilitates a larger role for individuals in securities 
class actions without marking a return to the pre-PSLRA days, when 
individual lead plaintiffs obtained the position by winning the race to the 
courthouse rather than on the basis of their investment in the defendant 
company. Unlike those individuals, the individuals for which this Article 
advocates as co-lead plaintiffs have a genuine stake in the outcome and 
every incentive to monitor class counsel. 
A risk of this co-lead plaintiff approach is that the conflicts described 
above could result in irreconcilable differences within the group.286 
 
285  S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690. 
286  Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1174 (2011) 
(noting potential intragroup conflicts including “an inability to reach consensus, arbitrary choices 
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Individual demands for maximum compensation could conflict with 
institutions’ ongoing investments in the issuer or their desire for corporate 
governance reform. In some instances, subclasses may be inevitable, as 
discussed below. But there should be few such cases. 
First, courts should be reluctant to create subclasses given that they 
contravene Congress’s intention that institutional investors should lead the 
class.287 Second, institutional investors often seek both monetary 
compensation and corporate governance reform, and a restructuring of 
settlements to place increased emphasis on the former should not trigger 
extensive institutional resistance as long as it does not place the institutions’ 
ongoing investment in the issuer at risk. Because many settlements are 
covered not by the corporation alone but by directors’ and officers’ 
insurance policies, and occasionally by contributions from underwriters and 
professionals too,288 a conflict in which the institutions would actually be 
opposed to monetary compensation and only willing to accept corporate 
governance reform should be rare. Third, it is possible, if not likely, that the 
addition of individual investor co-lead plaintiffs would not lead to a net 
decrease in corporate governance reform in exchange for greater 
compensation but will lead to increased compensation alongside corporate 
governance reform. Individual investors are more sympathetic in the eyes of 
the public than large institutional investors.289 In the rare instance in which 
these cases go to trial, individual investors are often presented to the jury 
because they make more sympathetic witnesses.290 Presenting such investors 
before the judge, defense counsel, or the defendants may strengthen the 
emotive if not the legal case for monetary compensation, giving the 
defendants a preview of what the trial might be like and influencing the 
primary actors in favor of additional monetary compensation. Institutional 
investors are rarely positioned to make persuasive, sympathetic arguments 
that they were meaningfully harmed by the fraud, if not debilitated by it; 
monetary compensation arguments made by institutional investors look like 
stalking horses for the “true” motive of maximizing pay for their lawyers. 
 
through group voting, and strategic behavior through withholding consent” (citing SCOTT E. PAGE, THE 
DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS AND 
SOCIETIES 256–57 (2007)). 
287  H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 
(noting that Congress “intend[ed] that the lead plaintiff provision will encourage institutional investors 
to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits”); see also Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. 
Supp. 542, 549 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (“The best way for the Court to effectuate the purposes of the Reform 
Act is to appoint [a] sole Lead Plaintiff.”). 
288  David M. Gische, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance, FINDLAW, http://library.
findlaw.com/2000/Jan/1/241472.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2012). 
289  See generally David M. Herszenhorn, Big Banks, U.S. Cities, Common Space: In Louisville, an 
Illustration of How Lines Can Blur, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at B1 (noting the existence of “loose 
rhetoric pitting Wall Street against Main Street”). 
290  See Shapiro, supra note 29, at 208. 
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And as discussed below, the creation of subclasses exposes shareholders to 
divide-and-conquer exploitation by defendants. Rational shareholders 
should recognize the dangers of such exposure and make every effort to 
work within the co-lead plaintiff structure. 
Finally, this proposed procedure offers all of the benefits enumerated 
above at minimal cost to courts in terms of added workload. In fact, there 
are strong reasons to believe that it will actually reduce burdens on the 
court. In the most likely scenario, the additional up-front investment of 
court time may be measured in minutes. Instead of reviewing a set of lead 
plaintiff application papers from institutional investors alone, courts will 
also review such applications from individuals. Institutional and individual 
investors may even apply jointly for the co-lead plaintiff position, thereby 
adding no additional briefs to the file. As with many current lead plaintiff 
fights, the outcome may be decided on the briefs alone. The papers will 
state the individual co-lead plaintiff applicant’s losses and provide some 
background information about the applicant and the selected counsel. The 
court may wish to assess these losses relative to the applicant’s total 
portfolio or assets by requesting that information in advance. Lead plaintiff 
application hearings, to the extent they occur, tend to last half a court day at 
the most. There is no reason to believe that the procedure propounded here 
will add materially to the efforts courts undertake anyway. 
Moreover, co-lead plaintiffs have become increasingly prevalent in 
securities and transactional class actions. For example, in a hand-collected 
dataset of all 453 Delaware class and derivative actions filed from October 
2003 to December 2009, 44% of all cases contained at least two co-lead 
plaintiffs, nearly a quarter were led by three or more plaintiffs, and nearly 
10% were led by five or more plaintiffs.291 Thirty percent of all cases led by 
an institutional investor were led by more than one such investor.292 Nearly 
a quarter of all cases contained at least one institutional and one individual 
lead plaintiff, albeit an individual who was not selected according to the 
procedure outlined here.293 In short, courts are already well-practiced in 
selecting co-lead plaintiffs. Nor is there any reason to believe that cohesive 
groups of multiple lead plaintiffs result in underperformance.294 In the early 
years following passage of the PSLRA, plaintiffs’ lawyers attempted to 
aggregate very large groups of investors (sometimes numbering in the 
thousands) for purposes of meeting the largest financial interest test.295 
 
291  Data on file with author and the Northwestern University Law Review. 
292  Id. 
293  Id. 
294  But see Burch, supra note 286, 1111–12 (2011) (arguing that “lead plaintiff groups have 
performed poorly historically”). 
295  See, e.g., In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(facing competing lead plaintiff applications from one group consisting of more than 1725 investors, 10 
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Some commentators expressed understandable concern that these large, 
aggregated groups of lead plaintiffs would ineffectively monitor class 
counsel, undermining a primary goal of the PSLRA.296 This practice of 
aggregating very large numbers of lead plaintiffs into lead plaintiff groups 
has all but disappeared.297 But there is little to suggest that a single lead 
plaintiff is superior to a small group, especially for the types of cases 
discussed here. Cox and Thomas conclude that single individual lead 
plaintiffs outperform groups in “bottom-tier cases,” but that groups of 
individuals outperform single individual lead plaintiffs in “top-tier cases” 
(where the tiers are based on the market capitalization of the defendant).298 
As I noted earlier, the conflicts presented here are particularly problematic 
in top-tier cases in which it is more likely that an institutional investor will 
obtain a lead plaintiff appointment. 
Of course, it is true that more applications by more parties may lead to 
more conflicts at the lead plaintiff selection stage. But what the court saves 
in time on the back end may more than compensate for the additional up-
front investment. By obtaining a more representative lead plaintiff group, 
courts may substantially reduce objections to the typicality and adequacy of 
the class representatives at the settlement hearing. They may also be spared 
the ordeal of having to select an entirely new lead plaintiff group or new 
lead counsel because the selected lead plaintiff finds itself subjected to 
unique defenses. 
In short, my proposal favoring appointment of individual co-lead 
plaintiffs will not materially increase the burdens on courts but will instead 
likely reduce that burden. 
B. Subclasses of Institutional and Individual Plaintiffs 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(5) grants courts the discretion to 
create subclasses, stating that “[w]hen appropriate, a class may be divided 
 
of whom were applying for appointment as lead counsel, and another consisting of “over 100 institutions 
and thousands of individuals”). 
296  See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead 
Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 54 (2001) (noting concerns regarding the 
use of aggregation to unite large numbers of unrelated investors into a lead plaintiff group); see also R. 
Chris Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as Sole Lead 
Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1218–19 (1999) (“[A]ggregation shifts control of 
securities fraud litigation from investors to their attorneys.”). 
297  Paul Dutka, Joshua S. Amsel & Carrie E. Davenport, Strange Bedfellows: Appointing Lead 
Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, BUS. & SEC. LITIGATOR (Mar.–Apr. 2006), available at 
http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=8470 (criticizing the aggregation of large lead plaintiff 
groups and noting recent judicial rejections of such groups). 
298  Cox et al., supra note 5, at 1632–34; see also Cox et al., supra note 174, at 375 tbl.6 (showing 
that the mean and median ratio of recoveries to provable losses is higher for groups of individual lead 
plaintiffs than for single individual lead plaintiffs). 
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into subclasses that are each treated as a class under this rule.”299 There is 
little precedent construing the rule, and the academic commentary on it has 
been sparse.300 Courts create subclasses when certain class members 
“require specialized or distinct treatment,”301 whether such distinct 
treatment refers to claims or remedies.302 Here, both individual and 
institutional investors have largely the same interests in prevailing on 
liability issues.303 Primarily, it is conflicts over remedies that set them apart. 
Probably the purest way to solve these conflicts is to separate individual 
and institutional investors into subclasses. 
As noted above, the Cendant court suggested that subclasses may be a 
way to cope with conflicts between selling and holding plaintiffs.304 This is 
one small logical step away from suggesting subclasses for individual and 
institutional investors, as the subclass of sell plaintiffs may be primarily 
composed of individual investors, whereas the subclass of hold plaintiffs 
conversely may be composed mostly of institutional investors. Still, even 
Cendant shied away from appointing subclasses for selling and holding 
plaintiffs on the grounds that if such a conflict were itself disqualifying, it 
would undercut Congress’s intention that institutions obtain lead plaintiff 
appointments.305 Without something more, the sell–hold conflict alone 
failed to justify subclasses. Yet it may be the case that conflicts over 
derivatives trading or corporate governance reform could tip the balance in 
favor of subclasses, at least under Cendant. (The sell–hold distinction is 
meaningless in the context of state-level transactional litigation, although it 
bears some resemblance to the situation where the institution is invested in 
both the target and the acquirer.) 
The Cendant court’s reluctance to grant subclasses in the face of strong 
conflicts between sell and hold plaintiffs—conflicts that were particularly 
acute because the defendant issuer went bankrupt—demonstrates how 
strongly courts weigh Congress’s intention that institutional investors lead 
the plaintiff class.306 The co-lead plaintiff approach honors that intention 
while subclasses cut against it, as they leave institutional lead plaintiffs in a 
 
299  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5). 
300  See e.g., Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2351 (2006) (detailing the lack of 
jurisprudence on subclassing in class action litigation). 
301  In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 316 (3d Cir. 1998). 
302  1 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:32, at 454–55 (4th ed. 
2002) (noting that class members may have a common interest in prevailing on liability but competing 
interests in seeking relief and that such conflict may be resolved through subclasses). 
303  In re Gemstar–TV Guide Int’l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 447, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(“However, ‘[e]very class member shares an overriding common interest in establishing the existence 
and materiality of misrepresentations.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 
891, 910 (9th Cir. 1975))). 
304  In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 244 n.25 (3d Cir. 2001). 
305  Id. at 243–44 & n.25. 
306  See id. (giving Congress’s intent great weight). 
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position where they are only representing other institutions. Because 
subclasses cut against Congress’s intent to see institutional investors 
leading class actions, the burden should be high on any party seeking such a 
remedy, which should only be utilized in extreme circumstances. For 
example, in a case in which damages are a particularly high percentage of 
the issuer’s total assets—such that even a relatively moderate rate of 
recovery for investors would harm the company—and where another 
conflict such as derivatives trading is present, the interests of institutional 
and individual investors might diverge so greatly that they could not be 
harmonized without running afoul of typicality and adequacy requirements. 
Moreover, even if subclasses did not run afoul of Congress’s intention 
that securities class actions be led by institutional investors, they may be a 
cure worse than the disease. The sophistication of institutional investors as 
lead plaintiffs is not in dispute. Their frequent access to in-house counsel; 
their repeat relationships with the lead plaintiffs’ law firms; their 
management of billion-dollar portfolios; their role as repeat market players; 
their widespread relationships with other investors, with the companies they 
invest in and with Wall Street; and their roles as fiduciaries for their 
beneficiaries leave them well-placed to act as fiduciaries for the shareholder 
class.307 Securities class actions featuring institutional investor lead 
plaintiffs recover more for shareholders than securities class actions led by 
individual investors,308 although it is difficult to discern whether this is 
because the institutions are better at litigating these cases or because they 
simply “cherry pick” the best ones. It may well be the case that individual 
investors would fare better overall under the status quo than under a regime 
in which they recover damages as part of a separate subclass of individual 
investors. 
The argument of this Article is that investors’ interests are optimized in 
a co-lead plaintiff structure. The key from the point of view of individual 
investors is to harness the benefits of an institutional lead plaintiff while 
mitigating the disadvantages. Subclasses deprive individual investors of 
both the advantages and disadvantages of institutional lead plaintiffs. 
Moreover, because Congress expressed a preference that lead plaintiffs be 
sophisticated and motivated, subclasses similarly deprive institutional 
investors of the benefits of highly motivated individual investors with 
 
307  See generally Cheng et al., supra note 5, at 356–62 (using a database from 1996 to 2005 and 
controlling for case determinants of having an institutional lead plaintiff, finding that institutional 
investors, including public pension funds, decrease the probability of a case being dismissed, increase 
monetary recoveries, and improve the independence of boards at defendant companies); Cox et. al., 
supra note 5, at 1589 (studying the benefits of institutional lead plaintiffs). 
308  Cox et. al., supra note 5, at 1592, 1631–32 (finding that “the presence of an institutional lead 
plaintiff improves the settlement size, even holding constant estimated provable losses, firm market 
capitalization, the length of class period, and the presence of an SEC enforcement action,” and 
concluding that the presence of “[i]nstitutional lead plaintiffs . . . increase settlement size, all other 
things being held constant”). 
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relatively high losses. Rule 23(b)(3) merely requires that questions of law 
or fact common to the class predominate and that the class action device be 
superior to individual actions, not that the claims should be uniform or that 
the class action device be flawless.309 The Supreme Court has noted that 
securities class actions readily satisfy the predominance standard.310 
Finally, as a strategic matter, subclasses allow defendants to “divide 
and conquer” the plaintiffs.311 There are numerous potential permutations of 
how defendants could exploit subclasses. They could offer comparatively 
generous terms to the first settling subclass while threatening to deploy 
maximum litigation resources against the second. They could exploit 
competition between the subclasses’ respective plaintiffs’ law firms, 
consenting to higher fees for one subclass or the other. Subclasses empower 
defendants to impose asymmetrical costs on competing groups of 
shareholders, which invariably improves the defendants’ settlement 
position. A united shareholder front presents a more daunting challenge and 
will likely result in more favorable settlements for the shareholders. 
Subclasses may be a cure that is more harmful than the conflicts of interest 
they are designed to remedy. 
Still, the conflicts addressed in this Article are serious enough that 
subclasses should not be ruled out as a possible solution. Courts should be 
reluctant, but not unwilling, to create them. The co-lead plaintiff structure is 
preferable for the reasons outlined above. That co-lead plaintiff structure is 
enhanced by the remote but real possibility that courts could impose 
subclasses if necessary. The threat that either institutions or individuals 
could obtain subclasses ought to keep either side (more likely institutions) 
from attempting to impose their own priorities on the co-lead plaintiff group 
at the expense of the other. Such an arrangement should help ensure that the 
costs individuals or institutions impose on each other in negotiations over 
remedies will remain lower than the costs imposed on each by subclasses. 
Should either side conclude that the costs of the co-lead plaintiff 
arrangement exceed that of subclasses, one would expect that a subclassing 
motion would follow. The co-lead plaintiff offers an intermediate step 
between the status quo and the imposition of subclasses—one that ought to 
solve the typicality and adequacy problem. Courts may always resort to 
subclasses if the co-lead plaintiff arrangement fails. In order to give the co-
lead structure an opportunity to succeed, courts should be reluctant to 
impose subclasses in the absence of a motion by a co-lead plaintiff calling 
for this remedy in light of irreconcilable conflicts within the lead plaintiff 
group. 
 
309  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
310  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (“Predominance is a test readily met 
in . . . cases alleging . . . securities fraud . . . .”). 
311  Burch, supra note 286, at 1134 (noting risk of creating subclasses with no settlement leverage). 
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C. Should Individual Co-lead Plaintiffs Be Represented by 
Separate Counsel? 
A lingering question for courts will be whether the individual co-lead 
plaintiffs should be represented by separate counsel or by the same counsel 
as the institutional lead plaintiffs.312 Institutional investors themselves often 
serve as co-lead plaintiffs in couples or groups of other institutional 
investors represented by co-lead counsel; the notion of multiple lead 
counsel does not depart greatly from current practice.313 Attorneys 
representing both institutional and individual investor co-lead plaintiffs 
would have incentives to cater to the interests of each. Because the 
attorneys’ fees are based on the dollar recovery and not on corporate 
governance reform, the attorneys’ incentives align well with individual 
investors seeking to maximize recovery.314 But because attorneys are repeat 
players and institutions have the potential to be repeat players,315 the 
attorneys might prioritize institutional interests in the hope of attracting 
future business or to prompt referrals to other institutions. The attorneys’ 
calculation would balance increased attorneys’ fees in the present case 
versus the value of future institutional business and referrals. Some of this 
calculation could depend on which institution(s) the attorneys happen to 
represent in any given case. Among institutional investors that have 
obtained lead plaintiff appointments, a substantial portion have done so just 
once.316 This could be because the fund has no intention of participating 
again, but was drawn to the lead-plaintiff role because of unique 
circumstances pertaining to a particular case, or it could be that the fund 
will become a repeat player in the future. Some funds have obtained as 
many as nine appointments.317 A law firm representing the latter type of 
fund might be more inclined to slant its representation towards the 
 
312  See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and 
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2169 (2000) 
(noting that lawyers may not adequately represent the conflicting interests among different class 
litigants); see also Nancy J. Moore, Ethics Matters, Too: The Significance of Professional Regulation of 
Attorney Fees and Costs in Mass Tort Litigation—A Response to Judith Resnick, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
2209, 2215–23 (2000) (discussing class counsel’s ethical obligations in representing conflicted class 
members); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in 
Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1483–84 (1998) (discussing the extensive role 
played by class counsel in allocating settlement proceeds). 
313  See Webber, supra note 96, at 2051. 
314  See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2059 (noting attorneys typically receive 20%–30% of 
the monetary recovery). 
315  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2006) (allowing any plaintiff to serve as lead plaintiff no more 
than five times in a three-year period). 
316  See, e.g., Webber, supra note 96, at 2048, 2056 (finding that seventy-eight public pension funds 
obtained lead plaintiff appointments between 2003 and 2006). In unpublished results based on the same 
data used for the paper cited here, I find that just forty-three of these funds served in a lead plaintiff role 
more than once. 
317  Id. at 2056. 
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institution than would a firm representing an institution it expects will not 
become a repeat player. On the other hand, a once-only institutional lead 
plaintiff might incline an attorney to maximize recovery subject to the 
probability that the institution could become a meaningful source of 
referrals or a repeat player itself. In part, the law firm’s assessment may 
depend on whether the institution in question has submitted to portfolio 
monitoring by the firm. 
One way to cope with attorneys serving more than one master would 
be to appoint separate counsel for individual and institutional investors. 
Attorneys representing the individual co-lead plaintiff would, in theory, act 
based on the priorities of that plaintiff. But the underlying question remains: 
what are the attorneys’ incentives? This leads to the crucial issue of how 
they will be paid. If we assume that counsel for the individual co-lead 
plaintiff will be compensated for its work on behalf of the individual 
investors alone, then the potential recovery for such attorneys in many cases 
could be too small to attract quality counsel.318 In Delaware, courts weigh 
the “competence of counsel and their access to the resources necessary to 
prosecute the claims at issue” in selecting lead plaintiffs in the first place,319 
and federal courts similarly consider the competence of proposed lead 
plaintiff’s counsel in selecting a lead plaintiff.320 
Conversely, high attorneys’ fees commanded by individual investor 
counsel would be removed from the pockets of institutional investor 
counsel. The downside risks of separate counsel include the possibility of 
either poor quality legal work for individual investors or a net increase in 
attorneys’ fees paid by the class as institutional counsel demand higher 
compensation to make up for fees earned by individual counsel. Arguably, 
such higher fees could be worth the cost of improved representation, 
particularly if it results in increased compensation for the class. However, in 
general, courts will not want to see lawyers collecting an even greater share 
of class recoveries than they already do. 
Depending on the case, such concerns about the zero-sum nature of 
attorneys’ fees may be exaggerated. The absolute value of fees in the 
blockbuster cases that plaintiffs’ lawyers bring to compensate for the costs 
of shepherding a portfolio of class actions through the almost-insuperable 
barriers of pretrial securities litigation practice—such as the bar on 
discovery prior to a ruling on the motion to dismiss and the highest pleading 
 
318  See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 1, at 2094 (arguing that individual investor recoveries 
constitute a small percentage of total dollar recoveries in securities class actions). 
319  Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., No. Civ.A. 19575, 2002 WL 1558342, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 
3, 2002) (citing DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(a); see Youngman v. Tahmoush, 457 A.2d 376, 379–80 (Del. Ch. 
1983)). 
320  See, e.g., In re MicroStrategy Inc. Sec. Litig., 110 F. Supp. 2d 427, 438 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“[A] 
district court should approve plaintiff’s choice of lead counsel based solely on that counsel’s 
competence, experience, and resources . . . .”). 
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standard in contemporary civil procedure—may be high enough to bear 
further subdivision among additional counsel without damaging anyone’s 
desire to take the job. 
Alternatively, individual and institutional counsel could be 
compensated based upon the recovery for the class as a whole and not just 
their particular clients. The difficulty here is that one might question how 
separate counsel would add value if they will be responding to the same 
incentives as the institutional counsel, balancing recovery in the current 
action against the potential to attract institutional clients in a future action. 
Ultimately, the factors outlined above—the proportional share of 
individual investor damages, the incentives of institutional counsel in any 
particular case, and the total dollar size of the potential recovery—are case 
specific and best known to the trial judge. Rather than impose a one-size-
fits-all solution, trial court judges should exercise their discretion in 
deciding whether to appoint separate counsel for the individual co-lead 
plaintiff.321 
CONCLUSION 
Judges in securities and transactional class actions must balance two 
vital commands: appointment of an institutional investor lead plaintiff—the 
purpose of the “largest financial interest” provision of the PSLRA and the 
practice followed in Delaware—and appointment of a typical and adequate 
class representative as required by Rule 23.322 Although these commands 
have been portrayed as being in concert with one another, this Article 
argues that they frequently conflict. Institutional investors’ derivatives 
trading, their practice of retaining equity in the defendant company even 
after the fraud has been exposed, their use of litigation to pursue corporate 
governance reforms, and, in state-level transactional cases, their 
maintenance of equity in both target and bidder companies create incentives 
that at times diverge from those of individual investor class members. In 
many instances, appointment of institutional lead plaintiffs strains Rule 23 
requirements that a lead plaintiff be both a typical and adequate class 
representative. 
While the status quo is unsatisfactory from the perspective of 
individual shareholders, total elimination of these conflicts by dividing 
 
321  See Andrew S. Gold, Experimenting with the Lead Plaintiff Selection Process in Securities Class 
Actions: A Suggestion for PSLRA Reform, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 448–49 (2008) (advocating judicial 
experimentation with the lead plaintiff selection process). 
322  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2006) (“[T]he court shall adopt a presumption that the most 
adequate plaintiff . . . is the person or group of persons that—(aa) has either filed the complaint or made 
a motion . . . [to be appointed lead plaintiff]; (bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest 
financial interest in the relief sought by the class; and (cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., 
No. 18336, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (adopting a similar standard). 
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shareholders into subclasses of institutional and individual plaintiffs would 
contravene the intent of the PSLRA, deprive individual investors of the 
benefits of institutional lead plaintiffs, and allow defendants to “divide and 
conquer” plaintiff shareholders. The sensible course for vindicating 
individual investor rights is for courts to appoint a sophisticated and 
motivated individual investor to serve as co-lead plaintiff with institutional 
investors. Courts should select such plaintiffs based on their financial 
interest in a case, similar to the way institutional lead plaintiffs are selected 
now. An individual co-lead plaintiff would be a voice for individual class 
members, not to disrupt corporate governance reforms or other settlement-
worthy objectives, but to remind institutions and the court that for some 
class members the only remedy for their injuries is money. 
